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EDITORIAL
Following the positive growth surprise in 
the first quarter of this year, the recovery of 
the euro area has pursued its course. The 
economy has actually expanded slightly 
faster than expected during the first half of 
the year, with growth accelerating towards 
potential, and should continue to expand at 
a similar pace throughout the rest of the 
year.  
While the higher growth prospects are of 
course welcome, there are no grounds for 
complacency. The recovery still looks 
relatively timid and unless growth 
accelerates further it would take a long time 
for the negative output gap to be closed and 
for employment creation to accelerate.  
In a context of a softening global economic 
environment, the contribution from exports 
to euro area growth will gradually diminish. 
An acceleration of growth will therefore 
depend upon an upturn in domestic 
demand. However, the indicators here 
remain mixed. While housing construction 
is showing early signs of a moderate 
recovery, business investment remains 
subdued. On the other hand, continued 
progress in redressing corporate balance 
sheets, supportive financial conditions and 
improved profitability on the back of a 
cyclical recovery in productivity have set the 
stage for a recovery in investment. 
Meanwhile private consumption picked up 
at the beginning of the year, but then 
decelerated in the second quarter. And while 
some consumption indicators have recently 
shown signs of strengthening, short-term 
prospects remain mixed as household 
spending is hampered by low confidence 
and a sluggish employment recovery. 
Since a more forceful recovery seems to be 
held back by a lack of confidence and 
uncertainty over the future policy course, 
policy makers must show the way ahead, by 
pursuing and setting in motion structural 
reforms that instil new dynamism and lift 
growth potential, and by clarifying the 
future policy agenda. I am therefore looking 
forward to the report by the High-Level 
Group on the Mid-Term Review of the 
Lisbon Strategy chaired by former Dutch 
Prime Minister Mr Wim Kok. I also 
welcome discussions on the proposals that I 
put forward in the Commission’s 
Communication "Strengthening economic 
governance and clarifying the 
implementation of the Stability and Growth 
Pact" of September 3rd 2004. This 
Communication responds to the June 
European Council’s call to strengthen and 
clarify the implementation of the Stability 
and Growth Pact. It builds on ideas 
contained in the Communication of June 
24th 2004 on “Public Finances in EMU – 
2004”.  Here I would like to draw attention 
to some of its key measures. 
First of all, I would like to stress that the 
two nominal anchors – the 3% reference 
value for the deficit to GDP ratio and the 
60% for the debt to GDP ratio – have 
proven their value and that they will 
continue to be the centrepiece of 
multilateral fiscal surveillance. The 
obligation on any Member State that 
breaches the rules to take prompt corrective 
action still stands.  
However, given the increasing economic 
diversification in an EU of 25 Member 
States, in particular with regard to explicit 
and implicit debt levels, a uniform medium-
term target for all countries does not appear 
to be appropriate. In view of this fact and 
given the experience of 5 years in EMU, I 
believe that we can enhance the credibility 
and enforceability of our fiscal framework 
by emphasising the economic rationale for 
the Pact, by taking greater account of 
economic fundamentals and by better 
interlinking the instruments for EU 
economic governance in order to enhance 
the contribution of budgetary policy to 
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economic growth. This will involve a 
number of practical steps.  
First, the Pact should place greater emphasis 
on debt and sustainability in the surveillance 
of budgetary positions. I have proposed, 
therefore, that multilateral surveillance 
should focus more on debt dynamics than 
has been the case so far in order to 
complement the continued rigorous 
attention to deficit developments. 
Secondly, the Pact needs to pay closer 
attention to economic circumstances and 
developments when setting the medium-
term budgetary objective for each Member 
State in a Union of 25. Let me stress that 
this is not about creating an “à la carte” Pact 
but rather about applying economic 
rationale in a more economically diverse EU 
of 25 Member States. At the same time, this 
medium-term objective should ensure 
compliance at all times with the 3% of GDP 
rule and therefore guarantee equal treatment 
within the Union. 
Thirdly, there is a need to ensure earlier 
action to correct inappropriate budgetary 
developments during more favourable 
periods of the economic cycle. With 
hindsight, it is all too obvious that if some  
Member States had made more 
consolidation efforts during the good years, 
1999 and 2000, then the excessive deficits 
that exist today might have been avoided. 
To do this we must strengthen peer 
pressure, possibly also by using actively early 
warnings. 
Finally, let me reiterate that a greater effort 
is needed in the EU to coordinate action on 
structural reforms and efforts to implement 
the Lisbon agenda. Europe needs to raise its 
growth potential, create more jobs and 
prepare itself for the future. Although the 
Stability and Growth Pact has a leading role 
to play in this process, full use should be 
made of all policy instruments. The Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines in particular 
have an important contribution to make 
because of their focus on broader issues of 
macroeconomic stability and structural 
reform in the EU.  
 
 
Joaquín ALMUNIA 
MEMBER OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION 
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I. Economic situation in the euro area 
The recovery of the euro-area economy is continuing. GDP expanded slightly faster than expected during the first half of the 
year with growth accelerating to around its potential. The expansion is set to continue during the second half of the year but 
a recent softening of some leading indicators suggests that a further acceleration of growth is unlikely in the months to come. 
A strongly supportive global environment has been the main engine of the euro-area recovery while domestic demand has, so 
far, failed to gather sustained momentum. Exports will continue to support growth in the months to come but some evidence 
of a softening of the global economy has recently emerged as surging oil prices have taken their toll. On the domestic side, 
housing construction is showing early signs of a moderate recovery but business investment remains subdued. Companies have 
restructured their balance sheets, financial conditions remain supportive and profitability has improved on the back of a 
cyclical recovery in productivity. Hence, the lacklustre performance of investment is more likely to be related to uncertainties 
regarding the medium-term outlook for demand than to supply-side constraints. Private consumption picked up at the 
beginning of the year but decelerated again in the second quarter. A number of indicators related to consumption have 
recently shown some strengthening but short-term prospects remain mixed as household spending is hampered by low 
confidence and a sluggish employment recovery. 
1. Recent economic developments and 
short-term prospects1 
The euro-area recovery is pursuing its course  
Recent indicators suggest that the euro-area 
recovery is pursuing its course with growth close 
to its potential rate. According to Eurostat’s latest 
national account release, GDP increased by 0.5% 
quarter-on-quarter in the second quarter of 2004, 
i.e. only marginally below the 0.6% registered in 
                                                     
1 The cut-off date for the statistics included in this issue 
was 30 September 2004.  
the first quarter. Most of the growth momentum 
came from the external sector. Exports surged, 
registering their fastest quarterly rate of 
expansion since early 2000 and allowing net trade 
to make a strong positive contribution to GDP 
growth despite a sharp acceleration of imports. In 
contrast, domestic demand remained nearly flat 
as a result of sluggish private consumption and 
anaemic capital formation. After a moderate 
build-up in the previous two quarters, inventories 
were cut slightly during the three months to June.     
Table 1: Euro-area growth components 
Forecast (1) 
 2003 Q3 
2003 
Q4 
2004 
Q1 
2004 
Q2 
Carryover 
to 2004 2004 (2) 2005 (2) 
 % change on previous period, volumes 
GDP 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.5 1.5 1.7 2.3 
Private consumption 0.2 0.0 0.6 0.3 0.9 1.6 2.3 
Government consumption 0.6 0.4 0.1 0.6 1.3 1.2 1.3 
Gross fixed capital formation 0.0 0.8 -0.2 0.1 0.5 2.4 3.6 
Changes in inventories (% of GDP) -0.4 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 
Exports of goods and services 2.5 0.4 1.4 3.7 5.5 4.9 5.9 
Imports of goods and services 1.3 1.9 0.3 2.9 4.5 5.0 6.6 
 % contribution to change in GDP 
Private consumption 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.5 1.1 1.6 
Government consumption 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 
Gross fixed capital formation 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.7 
Changes in inventories -0.3 0.6 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 
Net exports 0.5 -0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.0 -0.1 
(1) Annual change in %.         (2) European Commission Spring 2004 Forecasts. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Only government consumption showed some 
strength, accounting for a large fraction of the 
meagre overall growth in domestic spending.  
Encouragingly, the growth momentum in Q2 
was broad-based both in sectoral and 
geographical terms.  
Except for the Netherlands and Greece, where 
GDP contracted in the second quarter, activity 
expanded robustly in most euro-area countries. 
Furthermore, second-quarter growth – when 
positive – was both above potential and slightly 
accelerating in most cases with only Italy and 
Spain reporting a moderate deceleration of 
activity.  
Activity picked up momentum in construction 
as well as in most service sectors in the second 
quarter, while the industrial sector continued to 
show sustained growth.2 A moderate 
deceleration was only registered in the trade, 
transport and communication sector. Overall, 
the total value added of all sectors increased by 
0.7% in Q2, a level of growth similar to that 
registered in Q1 and superior to GDP growth. 
The discrepancy between growth in total value 
added and GDP was actually unusually large in 
the second quarter, a fact that seems to be 
attributable to changes in indirect taxation 
                                                     
2  Based on Eurostat’s breakdown of euro-area GDP into 
6 broad industrial sectors. 
(most notably in Germany). This suggests that 
second-quarter GDP data may have slightly 
underestimated the strength of growth in the 
euro area.  
Graph 1: Confidence indicators, euro area  
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(1) Normalised. 
Source: Commission services. 
Turning to the second half of the year, 
industrial production increased by 0.4% in July 
relative to June (2.4% y-o-y) but is likely to lose 
some momentum. An inflexion in business 
confidence has in fact been noticeable since 
August. ECFIN’s Business Cycle Indicator 
improved markedly in June and July but shed 
some of its gains in August and September as a 
result of a weaker assessment of export 
orderbooks, stocks and production trends. 
Table 2: Selected euro-area and national leading indicators, 2003-2004 
 SENT. IND1) BCI2) OECD3) PMI4) Reuters Ser5) IFO6) NBB7) ZEW8)
Long-term average 101.8 0.15 2.55 52.3 54.4 96.1 -11.2  
Trough in latest 
downturn 87.7 -1.45 3.71 42.9 46.7 87.2 -26.5  
November 2003 98.9 0.07 6.76 52.2 57.5 100.9 -8.8 67.2 
December 2003 97.2 -0.01 6.54 52.4 56.6 102.3 -6.9 73.4 
January 2004 98.5 0.15 6.29 52.5 57.3 102.8 -5.6 72.9 
February 2004 98.9 0.02 6.06 52.5 56.2 100.3 -6.8 69.9 
March 2004 98.9 -0.06 5.85 53.3 54.4 98.8 -4.1 57.6 
April 2004 100.1 0.39 5.25 54.0 54.5 97.7 -0.5 49.7 
May 2004 100.3 0.32 4.57 54.7 55.8 97.7 -2.5 46.4 
June 2004 99.7 0.43 3.83 54.4 55.3 96.0 -2.0 47.4 
July 2004 99.8 0.56 3.07 54.7 55.3 97.1 4.1 48.4 
August 2004 100.9 0.51  53.9 54.5 95.9 -2.1 45.3 
September 2004 100.7 0.48    95.7 -1.1 44.8 
1) Economic sentiment indicator, DG ECFIN. 2) Business climate indicator, DG ECFIN. 3) Composite leading indicator, six 
monthly change. 4) Reuters Purchasing managers index, manufacturing. 5)  Reuters Services purchasing manager index. 6) Business 
expectations, West Germany. 7)  National Bank of Belgium indicator for manufacturing. 8) Business expectations of financial market 
analysts, Germany. 
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Reuters PMI also dropped significantly in 
August. To a lesser degree, signs of weakening 
have also been visible in the service sector. 
ECFIN’s service survey remained broadly stable 
over the summer months but Reuters services 
activity index fell significantly in August.   
The recent softening of business confidence 
probably mostly reflects the downshift in global 
industrial production (see next section), as 
shown by a moderate weakening of export 
orders. However, it may also translate emerging 
concerns about prospects for domestic demand 
in the euro area as suggested by the fact that 
some indicators of confidence in the service 
sector are also affected.  
Nevertheless, indicators of business sentiment 
remain consistent with a continuation of the 
expansion in the euro area. In particular, 
Reuters manufacturing and service indices are 
still well above the 50 line that separates growth 
from contraction. This suggests that the 
recovery remains on track, although growth is 
unlikely to gather further momentum during the 
second half of the year. This assessment is 
confirmed by ECFIN’s indicator-based model 
for quarterly GDP growth, according to which 
GDP growth should be in a range of 0.3-0.7% 
in the third and fourth quarter (Graph 2). 
Graph 2: GDP growth, euro area 
(quarter-on-quarter growth) 
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(1) ECFIN’s indicator based forecast model. 
Source: Commission services. 
A supportive but softening global 
environment  
According to the estimates of the CPB 
Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy 
Analysis, world trade was still expanding at 
double digit growth rates in the summer. In July 
– latest available data – year-on-year growth in 
world trade in volume stood at 10.7%, down 
from the 13.7% peak registered in June.  
These recent trade data are somewhat at odds 
with the signs of softening in the world 
economy registered during the second quarter. 
World GDP growth is estimated to have halved 
from 1.7% q-o-q in the first quarter to 0.9% in 
the second quarter as higher interest rates, 
surging oil prices and a policy tightening in 
China took their toll. As a result of these 
factors, the world economy is likely to be 
somewhat less buoyant during the second half 
of the year than during the first months of 2004 
and the trade momentum should soften. In line 
with this assessment, the July reading of the 
quarterly World Economic Survey points to a 
deterioration of expectations regarding the 
future economic situation.3 ECFIN’s quarterly 
survey in the euro-area manufacturing sector 
also shows a moderate weakening in companies’ 
export expectations in the third quarter.  
Graph 3: World trade  
(year-on-year % changes in volume) 
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Source: CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis. 
                                                     
3  The WES is carried out by the IFO institute with the 
financial support of the European Commission. It is 
based on interviews with economic forecasters, 
researchers and policy makers around the world. 
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Recent development in the United States - The US 
expansion slowed down to an annual rate of 
3.3% in the second quarter from a very robust 
5% growth rate over the preceding twelve 
months. The slowdown was primarily due to a 
softening of private consumption owing not 
only to the substantial rise in energy prices, but 
probably also to a weakening effect of the fiscal 
and monetary policy stimulus injected in 2001-
2003. The available data for the third quarter are 
somewhat mixed, but again an annualised 
growth rate close to the economy’s long-term 
potential (3-3.5%) is likely. The Federal Reserve 
has started to raise short-term interest rates at a 
measured pace, as announced. 
Employment growth, which had been strong in 
the spring, fell back in the summer months to 
an unusually low rate for the third year of an 
economic upturn. The unemployment rate also 
drifted lower, reaching 5.4% in August. 
Inflation picked up in the first half of the year 
partly reflecting the increase in oil and 
commodity prices. But price developments 
became more benign in the third quarter with 
various measures of core inflation settling in the 
1-2% range. The current account deficit 
increased to 5.7% of GDP in the second 
quarter, reflecting both a widening goods and 
services deficit and a sharp deterioration of the 
net foreign investment income balance. 
Recent developments in Japan - The economic 
recovery in Japan has turned into a fairly broad-
based expansion, supported not only by external 
demand but also by structural improvements in 
the corporate and financial sectors. GDP 
growth decelerated markedly in the second 
quarter to an annualised 1.3%, down from 6.2% 
in the first three months of the year. However, 
the slowdown is, to some extent, distorted by 
problems related to seasonal adjustment. In 
addition, while public investment and 
inventories contributed negatively to growth, 
private consumption and private investment 
continued to show robust momentum. Overall, 
recent indicators point to a continuation of the 
expansion in Japan during the second half of 
the year although the peak of the upturn has 
probably passed.  
Recent developments in other parts of the world - 
Economic growth in Latin America gathered 
strong momentum in the first half of the year 
on the back of strong global demand, higher 
commodity prices, the return of foreign 
investors’ confidence and competitive exchange 
rates. Asian economies continue to make a 
substantial contribution to global growth with 
robust exports and rebounding domestic 
demand. Chinese authorities have responded to 
a built-up of inflationary pressures by tightening 
policy, which seems to have had some effect on 
the economy as evidenced by a deceleration of 
investment in the second quarter. Nevertheless, 
real GDP seems to be continuing to grow at a 
rate of about 9%. Growth also remains robust 
in the euro-area’s immediate neighbourhood. In 
the UK, GDP accelerated slightly from 0.7% in 
the first quarter to 0.9% in the second on the 
back of sustained investment and private 
consumption. Recent evidence also points to 
continued strong momentum in the economies 
of the new Member States.  
Signs of a rebalancing of growth towards 
domestic demand are still limited 
The contribution of domestic demand to GDP 
growth in the euro area was smaller in the 
second quarter of the year than in the first. 
Against the background of a possible softening 
of the external stimulus, the continued lack of 
vigour of domestic demand in the euro area 
may be seen as a source of concern for the 
sustainability of the euro-area recovery. Recent 
developments in investment and consumption 
provide only limited grounds for optimism in 
this respect.  
Gross fixed capital formation - After a mild 
contraction in the first quarter of the year          
(-0.2% q-o-q), gross fixed capital formation 
increased marginally in the second quarter 
(+0.1%). Two points relating to developments 
in capital formation since the beginning of the 
year are worth stressing. First, the lacklustre 
investment performance of the euro area as a 
whole masks large country differences. Second, 
the ongoing weakness of investment spending 
can be largely ascribed to the business sector.  
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A polarisation of investment performance is 
beginning to be visible at the Member State 
level. More than half of the countries for which 
data are available showed relatively sustained 
investment growth in Q2 with several of them 
registering an acceleration relative to Q1 
(France, Spain and Portugal). In contrast, capital 
formation was still moving along a 
contractionary path in Germany in the second 
quarter. It also dropped in the Netherlands and 
Belgium after a relatively strong showing in the 
first three months of the year.  
The analysis of the sectoral breakdown of fixed 
capital formation – only available up to the first 
quarter – indicates that the ongoing sluggishness 
of capital spending stems essentially from the 
business sector. After a pick-up in the second 
half of last year, spending on machinery and 
equipment remained flat in the first quarter. 
Following a relatively strong performance at the 
end of last year, non-residential investment 
dropped significantly in the first months of 
2004. These developments contrast with the 
moderate recovery observed in the housing 
sector since the last quarter of 2003 in most 
Member States with the notable exception of 
Germany.  
Recent indicators related to capital spending 
convey mixed messages and do not suggest a 
strong acceleration of business investment in 
the months to come. Although the high 
volatility of industrial new orders makes them 
difficult to interpret, they seem to have 
stabilised between May and July after sharp 
increases in the first months of the year.4 ECB 
data on financial flows also show a stabilisation 
of the annual growth rate of the total financing 
of the non-financial corporate sector at a low 
level of around 2% in the second quarter 
(Graph 4).5 More positively, household debt is 
expanding rapidly on the back of strong 
demand for mortgages. In the second quarter, 
                                                     
4  This is based on the indicator’s trendline. The year-on-
year growth of the actual indicator fell sharply over the 
same period. 
5  However, there is some evidence of a moderate pick-up 
of the growth of loans from monetary and financial 
institutions to the non-financial corporate sector since 
the spring, at least for loans of short to medium-term 
maturities.  See ECB Monthly Bulletin September 2004. 
total household financing was rising at only 
slightly below 8% in annual terms. There is early 
indication that momentum in mortgages 
remained strong in July with annual growth in 
lending by monetary and financial institutions 
for housing purchase above 9% (see also 
Graph 26). These developments suggest that the 
incipient recovery in the housing sector remains 
on track. 
Graph 4: Financing of the non-financial private sector,  
euro area (2002Q1-2004Q2 - annual growth in %) 
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Source: ECB. 
Overall, recent developments and the short-
term outlook for investment are disappointing, 
given the existence of supportive fundamentals 
and the recovery in activity registered since the 
beginning of the year. Interest rates are still low 
and profitability has improved (see Section 2 
“Assessing developments in profitability”). 
Furthermore, companies have improved the 
structure of their balance sheets by lengthening 
the maturity of their debt. The ECB bank 
lending survey for July also showed the first 
easing in banks’ credit standards for loans to 
enterprises since the survey began in 2003. 
Overall, balance sheet and financing constraints 
are unlikely to account for the persistent 
weakness in corporate investment spending (see 
Section 3 “The financial health of the private 
sector in the euro area”), the source of which is 
more likely to be related to uncertainties 
regarding the medium-term outlook for 
demand.  
Private consumption - Recent developments 
regarding household consumption are mixed. 
After increasing by 0.6% in the first quarter, 
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euro-area private consumption grew by a more 
modest 0.3% in the second quarter. The 
deceleration was relatively broad-based at the 
country level, likely reflecting the negative 
incidence of higher oil prices. However, as in 
the case of investment, a marked polarisation of 
the growth performance can be observed. 
Countries such as France, Spain and, to a lesser 
degree, Belgium, have experienced a relatively 
sustained consumption recovery since the 
beginning of the year whereas household 
spending has so far remained lacklustre in 
Germany and the Netherlands.  
Graph 5: Confidence in the household and retail trade 
sectors, euro area 
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Source: Commission services. 
Sluggish developments in private consumption 
are in line with evidence from surveys. 
Consumer and retail trade confidence 
strengthened during the course of last year but 
have remained broadly stable since the 
beginning of this year (Graph 5). At their 
present level, both indicators are consistent with 
positive but only sluggish growth in consumer 
spending. High oil prices, subdued household 
confidence and lacklustre employment growth 
will continue to hamper consumption growth in 
the months to come. Some prudence is 
therefore required when assessing the short-
term outlook for consumption. There are, 
however, several reasons for cautious optimism:  
¾ Firstly, the surge in oil prices since the spring 
does not seem to have weighed on consumer 
confidence.  
¾ Secondly, households have so far taken a 
benign view of recent inflation 
developments. Their assessment of past 
price developments, which had deteriorated 
markedly in the wake of the euro 
changeover, has continued to improve in the 
past months.  
¾ Thirdly, a few indicators have recently sent 
positive signals. Loan data show an inflexion 
in consumer credit growth alongside fast 
growth in loans for house purchases (see 
also Graph 26). Furthermore, the volume of 
retail sales in the euro area rose significantly 
in June and July.  
¾ Finally, sustained growth in mortgages 
shows that households are not reluctant to 
spend but prefer to opt for estate assets 
rather than other forms of consumption. 
This might suggest that uncertainties 
regarding medium-term income prospects 
continue to weigh on their spending 
decisions.  
A slow cyclical recovery of employment  
Labour markets have so far shown little signs of 
a recovery in the euro area as a whole. Total 
employment remained virtually unchanged in 
the region last year and recent developments do 
not suggest any noticeable pick-up since the 
beginning of the year.  
Graph 6: Employment growth and unemployment, 
euro area (quarterly data - in %) 
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(1) Quarterly year-on-year growth in %. 
Source: Commission services. 
Employment was flat in the first quarter of the 
year – latest available data – and there is indirect 
evidence that the situation did not improve 
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markedly in the second quarter. After a year of 
stability, the unemployment rate drifted slightly 
upwards from 8.9% to 9.0% in April and stayed 
at that level over the summer. Meanwhile, 
employment assessments in recent business 
surveys have remained mixed.  
Graph 7 displays companies’ assessment of the 
employment situation in the service sector as 
reported in ECFIN’s business survey. It 
includes both a backward- and a forward-
looking component as companies are asked to 
gauge the evolution of employment in recent 
months and its expected evolution in the 
months ahead. Both components have shown a 
modest upward trend since spring 2003. 
However, the improvement took place against 
the background of significant volatility and 
should therefore be interpreted with caution. 
Furthermore, a gap between companies’ 
expectations and their assessment of the recent 
past built up in the spring. It narrowed 
somewhat over the summer but remains 
positive, as current employment developments 
have recovered more slowly than expectations.  
The employment components of ECFIN’s 
business survey in the service sector track actual 
developments in total employment in the 
economy relatively closely with slight leading 
properties.6 On the basis of this correlation, it is 
likely that job growth in the second quarter was 
at best modest. Looking ahead, a significant 
acceleration of employment growth during the 
second half of the year appears unlikely unless 
surveys improve markedly.  
With the euro area enjoying a firm recovery of 
activity since the beginning of the year, recent 
developments in employment appear, on the 
face of it, disappointing. However, the analysis 
presented in Box 1 shows that employment and 
activity cycles tend to be lagged in the euro area 
and that the employment recovery is not at this 
stage unusually late compared with previous 
cycles.  
                                                     
6  The correlation between the backward-looking 
employment component of the survey in the service 
sector and total employment growth is about 85% for 
the relatively small sample over which the survey is 
available (i.e. 1997 to now ). 
Graph 7: Assessment of employment in ECFIN’s 
business surveys, euro-area service sector (1) 
-2.5
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
Jan-01 Jul-01 Jan-02 Jul-02 Jan-03 Jul-03 Jan-04 Jul-04
Employment in recent months
Employment in the months ahead
 
(1) Series are normalised with averages and standard deviations 
calculated over the 1997-2003 period.  
Source: Commission services. 
Nevertheless, the analysis presented in the box 
also suggests that employment growth could 
remain modest during the next few quarters. 
Employment was unusually resilient in the euro 
area in the latest downturn. It increased by more 
than 1% between the peak of the business cycle 
in late 2000 and its trough at the end of 2003. 
By way of comparison, employment fell by 1 to 
3% during the previous three major downturns 
in the mid-1970s, late 1970s and early 1990s. 
The comparatively strong performance in the 
latest downturn may be attributed to two 
factors: a trend increase in the employment 
content of growth that started around the mid-
1990s and a cyclical slowdown in productivity. 
The respective roles of the two factors are 
difficult to disentangle but Box 1 concludes that 
a substantial cyclical deceleration of productivity 
took place in 2001-03 on top of the structural 
increase in the employment content of growth. 
In other words labour hoarding was important 
during the downturn and labour productivity is 
likely to pick up significantly during the early 
stages of the recovery, allowing only modest 
growth in employment in the next few quarters.  
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Box 1: Is the employment recovery unusually late? 
 
After several quarters of stagnation, euro-area GDP has again been on an expansionary path since the third quarter 
of 2003. The progressive pick-up in activity has fuelled hopes that an employment recovery could be imminent but 
developments in employment indicators have so far remained disappointing. The present box examines the recent 
employment cycle in order to shed some light on the short-term outlook for employment.  
1. The employment cycle 
The analysis of short-term developments in employment is complicated by the existence of shifts in trend 
employment and productivity growth. Statistical filters can be used to disentangle short-term cyclical changes in 
employment from longer-term developments. The graphs below display the cyclical components of employment 
(on the left) and labour productivity (on the right) as extracted with a Baxter-King filter. Both cycles are plotted 
against the GDP cycle.  
 
Employment, productivity and GDP cycles (1), euro area 
(as a share of trend in %) 
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(1) Extracted with a Baxter-King filter. 
Source: Commission services 
 
Since the 1970s the employment cycle has tended to respond to changes in the business cycle with an average lag of 
1-2 quarters. However, this average picture conceals a significant asymmetry between the speed of the response in 
upturns and downturns. Whereas the employment cycle has generally peaked at the same time as or shortly after 
the GDP cycle, longer lags can be observed in the case of cyclical troughs. Lags were particularly long when the 
recovery in activity was sluggish or short-lived as was the case in the early 1980s and after the 1992-93 recession.  
Looking into recent cyclical developments, the left-hand graph suggests that the latest employment cycle was 
somewhat milder than its predecessor in the first half of the 1990s. The difference can only partly be ascribed to a 
less pronounced GDP cycle. This can be verified by looking at developments in the productivity cycle (right-hand 
graph). Reflecting the fact that productivity acts as a buffer against short-term variations in activity, the cyclical 
component of productivity is subject to more frequent short-term fluctuations than the employment component. 
However, the right-hand panel shows that the latest downturn was characterised by a sharp cyclical slowdown 
similar to what was observed in the recessions of the 1970s and much more pronounced than during the 1992-93 
recession.  
Overall, the analysis of de-trended employment data suggests two conclusions.  
¾ First, relatively long lags between the cyclical recovery in activity and employment are not unusual, especially if 
the pick-up in activity is moderate. Given that the trough in activity in the euro area only took place at the end 
of last year, the absence of clear signs of an employment upswing at this stage of the business cycle is not 
surprising.  
¾ Second, the latest downturn was characterised by a strong cyclical slowdown in productivity which presages a 
relatively soft cyclical recovery of employment as past labour hoarding reduces the potential for a strong 
employment pick-up. 
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2. Assessing the short-term outlook for employment  
To better assess the timing and strength of the forthcoming employment recovery, two employment equations 
were estimated.  
The first one simply relates quarter-on-quarter growth in employment to past GDP growth for various lags. A 
major difficulty with estimated employment equations is the structural downward shift in trend labour productivity 
which presumably took place in the 1990s. In the case of a simple growth specification the problem can be 
overcome by restricting the estimation period considered (here 1996 to 2003). Over the short sample considered 
the fit of the equation is quite good with, an R-squared of 0.85 indicating the key role played by GDP dynamics in 
explaining short-term employment developments.  
A major limitation of the simple equation described above is that it does not rest on solid theoretical 
underpinnings. Economic theory predicts that employment demand will depend not only on activity but also on the 
level of real wage and that its response to shocks will be slow owing to adjustment costs. To allow for these 
features, an employment demand equation modelled as an error correction mechanism was estimated over the 
1970Q1-2004Q1 period.  The equation is similar to the one proposed in Mourre (2004) (“Did the pattern of 
aggregate employment growth change in the euro area in the late 1990s?”, ECB Working Paper Series, No. 358, 
May 2004). Its long-term specification relates employment to GDP, real wages and a time trend. To account for the 
downshift in trend productivity registered in the 1990s, a structural break is introduced in 1997.  
The two equations were simulated over the 2004Q2-2005Q4 period based on the GDP projections presented in 
the Commission’s Spring 2004 Forecasts (adjusted for the positive growth surprise registered during the first half of 
2004). The corresponding two scenarios for the short-term employment outlook are shown in the graph and table 
below.  
 
Simulated employment growth in the euro area (1) 
 
Employment Productivity 
 2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005 
Error 
correction 
equat. (2) 
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(1) The employment and productivity growth presented for 2004 and 2005 are only benchmark simulation exercises and do not represent a 
Commission forecast.  
(2) Employment demand equation specified as an error correction model. See text for an explanation.  
(3) Equation relating growth in employment to growth in GDP. See text for an explanation. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Both equations suggest a return to employment growth during the second half of 2004 but with notable differences 
in the strength of the recovery. Based on the simple growth equation, employment should rapidly renew with 
expansion rates exceeding 1% in annualised terms. However, if the cyclical slowdown in productivity and the 
lagged effect of past increases in real wages are taken into account (as in the error correction model), the 
employment recovery could turn out to remain sluggish through 2005, with annualised growth rates not exceeding 
0.5%. The first scenario is difficult to reconcile with the weak level of employment still currently reported in 
business surveys. It is also difficult to reconcile with the analysis of the employment cycle presented above and the 
idea that a non-negligible part of the productivity slowdown in recent years was of a cyclical nature. However, the 
second (more pessimistic) scenario should also be considered with caution insofar as shifts in trend productivity are 
difficult to capture in estimated equations.  
Overall the analysis presented in this box suggests that the employment recovery is so far not unusually late but 
could be disappointingly moderate.  
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Persistent inflation pressures from oil prices  
HICP inflation remained clearly above 2% over 
the summer, easing slightly to 2.2% in 
September (Flash estimate), down from a peak 
of 2.5% in May. The higher level of headline 
inflation observed in the euro area since the 
spring is essentially attributable to a sharp 
increase in oil prices. The price of a barrel of 
Brent has been fairly volatile in the past months, 
climbing to 44$ in August before falling slightly 
during the first half of September and rising 
again to reach 46$ at the end of the month. 
Movements in oil prices tend to feed rapidly 
into headline inflation via an increase in the 
HICP energy component.7 In August, the 
annual change in the energy component was 
running at 6.5%, against -2% five months 
earlier. 
Graph 8: Consumer price inflation, euro area  
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Source: Commission services. 
Recent developments in the oil market do not 
suggest a rapid decrease of oil prices, and so 
associated inflation pressures are likely to persist 
for some time. In the months to come, the 
direct impact of higher oil prices via the energy 
component of the HICP will be compounded 
by indirect effects as producers pass through 
higher input costs into final prices. This pass-
through effect is beginning to be visible in 
producer price statistics. Producer prices have 
edged higher in the past months. The 
                                                     
7  In April and May the effect of the surge in oil prices was 
compounded be the reversal of the favourable base 
effect associated with the rapid fall in oil prices after the 
beginning of the Iraq war last year. 
acceleration can partly be ascribed to 
developments in the energy sector but also 
reflects increasing price pressures in the 
intermediate good sector, which themselves 
translate the delayed effect of higher oil and 
other commodity prices (Graph 9).  
Graph 9: Producer price inflation, euro area  
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Source: Commission services. 
A major source of uncertainty regarding the 
short-term outlook for prices in the euro area 
relates to forthcoming developments in wages 
and the possibility of second-round effects as 
consumers try to recoup losses in purchasing 
power. However, recent developments in terms 
of labour costs and inflation expectations are 
encouraging, showing persistent wage 
moderation and decelerating unit labour costs.  
¾ Based on Eurostat’s quarterly accounts, 
annual growth in wages per employee 
decelerated to 2% in the last quarter of 2003 
and the first quarter of 2004, according to 
the last available data (Graph 10).8 Eurostat 
data on hourly labour cost paint a similar 
picture of persistent wage moderation. Only 
limited more recent data are as yet available 
but the annual growth in the ECB’s indicator 
of negotiated wages slowed marginally to 
2.2% in the second quarter, from 2.3% in 
the first quarter.  
¾ Higher oil prices have not led to an upward 
drift in inflation expectations. Households’ 
                                                     
8  Wage rates are calculated as the ratio of the wage bill to 
the total number of employees.  
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assessment of the short-term outlook for 
prices (as measured in consumer surveys) 
increased in May and June but receded again 
over the summer. Inflation expectations 
derived from indexed bonds peaked in June 
at close to 2.4% before falling back to below 
2.2% in August despite a further-pick up of 
the oil price (see Graph 13). 
¾ Besides wage moderation, the ongoing 
cyclical recovery in labour productivity is 
translating into a deceleration of unit labour 
costs. In the first quarter of this year, year-
on-year growth in unit labour costs was at 
1%, its lowest level since 2000.  
Graph 10: Labour costs, euro area  
(quarterly data – year-on-year change in %) 
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Source: Commission services. 
 
Monetary and financial conditions remain 
favourable 
Monetary conditions in the euro area continue 
to be conducive to the economic recovery. With 
fairly stable real interest rates and a euro 
exchange rate that has continued to fluctuate in 
a relatively narrow range against most 
currencies, the MCI has remained almost 
unchanged since May (Graph 11). Short-term 
financial conditions in the euro area have 
remained favourable throughout the summer 
period. The ECB has kept its key policy rate 
unchanged for more than a year now, leaving 
nominal and real interest rates at historically low 
levels. Throughout the summer months, 
financial markets have expected a tightening in 
the euro area towards the first quarter of 2005. 
In the US, the Federal Reserve started to raise 
its key policy rates and to gradually withdraw 
monetary stimulus from the US economy. Key 
rates were raised by 25 basis points at each of 
the last three meetings of the FOMC reaching a 
level of 1.75%.  
Graph 11: Monetary conditions, euro area  
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Source: Commission services. 
 
Graph 12: 10-year government bond yields, euro area 
and USA (daily data) 
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Source: Datastream. 
Recent developments in longer-term financial 
conditions were more favourable over the 
summer than in the second quarter of the year. 
Bond yields edged up sharply in May and June, 
in the US even reaching the highest level in 
almost two years. This increase seemed to 
reflect changing perceptions among market 
participants of the Federal Reserve’s future 
monetary policy stance. Positive employment 
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data raised investors’ confidence in the strength 
of the US economic recovery, which led to 
expectations that the Fed would tighten its 
policy stance earlier than previously expected. 
In the euro area, bond yields rose in the spring 
with the confirmation of a more optimistic 
outlook and in the face of concerns about 
inflationary pressures, possibly related to oil 
prices (Graph 13).  
Graph 13: Break-even inflation rate and oil prices,  
euro area  
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Source: EcoWin. 
Nevertheless, since the end of June, ten-year 
government bond yields in the US and the euro 
area have again declined substantially, as market 
expectations about future growth have shifted 
downwards. During August, financial markets 
were mainly driven by geopolitical events, oil 
price developments and doubts about the 
sustainability of the US recovery. Markets 
traded a scenario that higher oil prices would 
slow down economic growth rather than being 
passed through into higher inflation. In 
addition, June and July data on the US labour 
market cast doubts on the robustness of the US 
recovery, implying that the moderation of 
economic growth observed in the second 
quarter in the US might continue longer than 
previously expected.  
Graph 14: Stock indices,  
(daily data – index 1 Jan 2003 = 100) 
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Source: Datastream. 
Turning to stock markets, the trend throughout 
the year has rather been flat with short periods 
of downward and upward developments. 
During July and early August global factors such 
as high oil prices and growth uncertainties put 
downward pressure on stock prices. Moreover, 
equity markets tended to ignore positive reports 
on second quarter earnings and instead focused 
on warnings about future profits. Since the 
second half of August, lower long-term interest 
rates and some easing in oil prices have 
translated into some upward movement on 
stock markets. By end-September stock market 
prices in the US, Japan and the euro area were 
slightly below their closing levels of end-2003. 
Compared to the average of 2003, stock market 
prices still have gained between 11% and 18% 
in 2004, depending on the index. 
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2. Assessing developments in 
profitability in the euro area 
Developments in profitability play an important 
part in determining inflationary pressures 
through wage-price dynamics and in 
determining firms’ investment and employment 
decisions. This article discusses both the long-
term trends in some macroeconomic 
profitability concepts in the euro area and their 
more recent developments.  
The long-term picture 
Graph 15 displays trends since the 1970s in two 
widely used measures of profitability, the net 
return on net capital and the profit mark-up (for 
an explanation of the two concepts and the 
associated measurement problems see Box 2 
“Measuring profitability – some conceptual 
issues”). The two measures have displayed 
similar trends since the 1970s. Both show a 
marked deterioration in profitability in the 
1970s followed by a recovery in the 1980s. 
There were further, although more moderate, 
pressures on profitability in the early 1990s and 
an improvement during the second half of the 
1990s. During the 2001-03 downturn, the profit 
mark-up remained broadly stable while the 
return on net capital edged slightly downwards.  
Graph 15: Two macroeconomic measures of 
profitability, euro area (1970-2003) 
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(1) Index 1995 = 100.  
Source: Commission services 
Fluctuations in profitability reflect a variety of 
factors of both a cyclical and a more structural 
nature.  
Reflecting slow adjustment in employment and 
the capital stock, profitability measures tend to 
display a marked cyclical component with 
profitability being eroded during downturns. 
This is true for the recession of the 1970s and 
of 1992-93 and, to a lesser degree, for the 2001-
03 downturn. Terms-of-trade shocks due to 
sharp fluctuations in exchange rates or swings in 
oil prices can also impact on profitability.  
Structural factors also play an important role in 
explaining changes in profitability. In the 1970s, 
a slow response of the labour market to a 
structural downshift in productivity growth 
took a heavy toll on profitability in the euro 
area. Conversely, wage moderation and 
improvements in the labour market permitted 
significant gains in profitability in the 1980s and 
the second half of the 1990s. Gains during the 
latter period were all the more remarkable in 
that they took place against the background of 
another deceleration of trend productivity 
growth.  
Changes in competition forces may also have a 
significant bearing on profit measures. Hence, 
some of the changes in profitability in the euro 
area in the late 1980s and the 1990s are likely to 
have been the result of the impact of the 
implementation of the Internal Market 
programme. Sauner-Leroy,9 using company-
level data, observes falls in price-cost margins 
between 1989 and 1993 consistent with 
increases in competition during the 
implementation period of the single market 
programme. It is only from about 1994 that 
firms are able to take advantage of efficiency 
gains resulting from heightened competitive 
pressures in the Internal  Market to raise price-
cost margins and profitability.  
                                                     
9  Sauner-Leroy J-B., ”The impact of the implementation 
of the Single Market Programme on productive 
efficiency and on mark-ups in the European Union 
manufacturing industry”, European Commission, DG 
ECFIN Economic Papers, No. 192. 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area III/2004 
 
 
 
- 18 - 
 - 
 
Box 2: Measuring profitability – some conceptual issues  
 
Several measures of profitability can be derived from national account data. The most frequently used concepts, as 
well as some of the associated methodological and measurement problems, are briefly presented in this box. 
1. Most frequently used macroeconomic profitability concepts  
Two broad families of profitability concepts can be distinguished. The first one is akin to the profit margin 
measures to be found in companies’ financial statements and includes concepts such as the wage share, the profit 
share and the profit mark-up. The second one is closer to the return on equity of companies’ financial statements 
and covers measures of profits divided by estimates of the capital stock.  
 
A few selected profitability concepts:  
Concepts Definitions Comments 
Profit share Ratio of gross operating surplus (GOS) 
to total value added 
The GOS is calculated as GDP 
(corrected for taxes and subsidies on 
production) minus the compensation 
of employees  
Wage share Ratio of the wage bill to total value 
added 
 
Profit mark-up Ratio of value added deflator and unit 
labour costs (i.e. inverse of the real 
unit labour cost) 
Unit labour costs are calculated as 
the ratio of total compensation to 
total value added in constant prices 
Net return on net capital stock Ratio of net domestic product minus 
compensation of employees to nominal 
capital stock 
The net domestic product is the gross 
domestic product (GDP) corrected 
for the depreciation of capital  
Note: in all these concepts, total compensation is generally augmented by the imputed wages of the self-employed. 
 
As far as possible, a representative of each family is used throughout this section. For data availability reasons, the 
analysis is restricted to the profit mark-up and the net return on net capital. The main advantage of the profit mark-
up is that it can be calculated both from annual and quarterly national account data. In contrast, measures of the 
profit share are not available at the quarterly level for the euro area as a whole. The net return on net capital was 
taken from ECFIN’s AMECO database. Its major limitation is that, in the absence of quarterly data on the capital 
stock of the euro area, it is only available on an annual basis.  
2. Measurement problems  
Profits calculated as a residual –  In the national accounts for some euro-area countries, profits are calculated as 
a residual, i.e. value added minus compensation to employees and other expenses, although a number of countries 
used data provided by companies (for further information regarding the methodology used to calculate profitability 
in OECD economies, see Walton R., “Sources of data for international comparisons of company profitability 
(methodology)”, paper prepared for the OECD meeting of national accounts experts, October 2002). Calculating 
profitability as a residual means that measurement errors may arise if other variables are incorrectly measured, while 
differences in collection methods between national statistical institutes are a further potential source of differences. 
Notwithstanding such issues, it is widely accepted that the adoption by all EU countries of the ESA 95 statistical 
framework has minimised differences in calculations and made comparisons of profitability across countries and 
over time more meaningful. However, more caution should be exercised in making comparisons of levels for any 
given year, particularly between the euro area and the USA. 
Treatment of self-employment – An important consideration in aggregate macroeconomic measures of 
profitability is the treatment of income from the self-employed, where earnings will reflect both a payment to 
labour and a return to entrepreneurial activity. In this note, an adjustment has systematically been made for this so-
called mixed income – apportioning only part of the income of the self-employed as profits. An alternative would 
have been to calculate measures of profitability for the corporate sector alone. However, detailed national account 
data for the corporate sector are only available at the annual level and for a limited number of countries. 
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Furthermore, comparisons between developments in profitability for the corporate sector and the economy as a 
whole do not point to conspicuously different patterns in those countries for which the data is available.  
Treatment of corporate taxes and financial expenses – A major limitation of the measures of profitability used 
in this note is that they are calculated gross of corporate taxes and interest payments. This means that 
improvements or deteriorations in profitability related to changes in corporate taxation, interest rates and debt 
levels are not taken into account.  
Capital depreciation – Difficulties in measuring capital depreciation present an argument for calculations of 
measures of return on capital to be made on a gross basis. But differences in the composition of the capital stock 
between countries, or changes in its composition over time, particularly the shift towards ICT capital with a higher 
depreciation rate, militate in favour of using a net calculation (for further discussion of the impact of different 
depreciation rates on profitability, see Metz R., Riley R., Weale M., ‘Economic performance in France, Germany 
and the United Kingdom: 1997-2002’, National Institute Economic Review Number 188, April 2004). 
 
 
Graph 16 displays trends in the profit mark-up in 
the euro area, the USA and the UK while 
Graph 17 displays a comparison for the net 
return on net capital. Due to methodological 
differences in national accounts, cross-country 
comparisons of profit measures should be 
approached with caution. However, several 
points stand out: 
¾ The US and the UK labour markets 
responded more swiftly to the shocks of the 
1970s (surge in oil prices, slowing labour 
productivity) allowing a much faster recovery 
of profitability.  
¾ The profit mark-up has increased more 
rapidly in the euro area than in the USA and 
the UK since the 1980s.  However, until the 
mid-1990s the trend owed much to a more 
rapid capital-labour substitution in the euro 
area. As a result, the profitability gap in favour 
of the USA and the UK with the euro area 
widened over the same period for measures of 
profitability based on capital such as the net 
return on net capital.  
¾ Pressures on profitability emerged in the late 
1990s in the UK and the USA leading to a 
narrowing of the gap with the euro area in 
terms of net return on net capital. However, 
the convergence trend was short-lived. The 
UK and US economies staged a rapid 
recovery in profitability during the downturn 
and the gap widened again in 2002-03.  
Graph 16: Profit mark-up, euro area, UK and USA 
(1970-2003 – index 1995 = 100) 
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Source: Commission services 
 
Graph 17: Net return on net capital,   
euro area, UK, USA (1970-2003 – In %) 
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Source: Commission services 
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Recent developments in profitability, labour 
productivity and wages 
Looking more closely into developments in 
profitability during the latest downturn, Graph 18 
shows quarterly estimates of the profit mark-up.10 
As fluctuations in the mark-up reflect the 
combined effect of changes in real wages and 
labour productivity, the graph also displays year-
on-year growth for these two variables. In the 
absence of capital stock data at the quarterly level, 
measures of return on capital cannot, 
unfortunately, be calculated at that frequency.  
Graph 18: Profit mark-up, labour productivity and real 
wages,(1) euro area  
(y-o-y changes in % unless otherwise specified) 
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(1) Real wages are measured as the total compensation per employee 
deflated by the GDP deflator.  
(2) Index 100 = 1995 
Source: Commission services 
The stabilisation of profit margins in the latest 
downturn took place despite a significant 
slowdown in labour productivity and was the 
result of a marked deceleration of real wages. The 
improvement of profitability since the middle of 
last year reflects the “scissors effect” of a 
combined cyclical pick-up in productivity and a 
further deceleration in real wages.  
Real wage developments during the downturn 
reflect both changes in nominal wages and 
                                                     
10  Theses estimates are calculated from quarterly national 
accounts, whereas the estimates presented in the previous 
section were based on annual national accounts. The two 
sources are broadly consistent although some differences 
can sometimes be observed. Hence the profit mark-up fell 
slightly in the late 1990s based on quarterly data while it 
remained stable based on annual data.  
changes in the GDP deflator (Graph 19).11 
Nominal wages reacted to the cyclical 
deterioration in activity with a lag, with a first 
phase of deceleration taking place in 2002 and a 
second one at the end of 2003. Until the end of 
2001, profit margins were essentially maintained 
by pushing up production prices, an increase 
which was rendered possible by the low external 
value of the euro. Since the second half of 2002, 
however, competitive pressures from the 
strengthening of the euro have curtailed 
producers’ pricing power. As a result, the 
deceleration in real wages registered in the past 
few quarters can be ascribed exclusively to 
nominal wage moderation rather than faster 
growth in prices.  
Graph 19: Nominal wage growth, euro area 
(y-o-y changes) 
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Source: Commission services 
Distinguishing developments in profitability 
in industry and service sectors 
National account data can be used to shed some 
light on the sectoral developments in profitability 
underlying the aggregate macroeconomic picture. 
Eurostat quarterly accounts provide a breakdown 
of the economy into 6 broad sectors for value 
added, wages and employment data. Based on 
these data, Graph 20 displays developments in 
profit mark-up in the industry and the service 
sector in the euro area. The profit mark-up tends 
to post a high quarterly volatility in the 
                                                     
11  Real wages in Graph 18 are measured by the nominal 
wage rate deflated by the GDP deflator.   
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manufacturing sector. To allow an easier reading, 
the graph is therefore based on annual averages.  
Graph 20: Profit mark-up by sector, euro area (1) 
(index 1995 = 100) 
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(1) Annual averages of quarterly data.  
Source: Commission services. 
Sharp improvements in the profit mark-up were 
registered during the second half of the 1990s in 
industry as well as in the service sector. Some 
tensions on profitability were visible in the late 
1990s in the two sectors, but developments were 
somewhat divergent in the ensuing downturn:  
¾ In industry, tensions on profitability were 
progressively reversed during the downturn 
and the mark-up reached a new peak in 2002 
before falling again somewhat in 2003. This 
cyclical development stands in sharp contrast 
with the pronounced deterioration in 
profitability registered in industry during the 
1992-93 recession.  
¾ In the service sector, profit margins remained 
broadly stable in 2001-02, before recovering 
slightly in 2003.  
Differences in the profitability performance of 
the two sectors during the downturn can be 
traced back to a number of factors:  
¾ In the early stages of the slowdown in activity, 
labour productivity was hit more strongly in 
industry than in services but industry staged a 
much more rapid recovery in productivity 
growth (Graph 21).  
¾ Developments in nominal wages were fairly 
similar in the two sectors except in 2003 when 
a significant divergence results from both a 
pick-up in the growth of compensation per 
employee in industry and a slowdown in 
services (Graph 22). Wage moderation is 
actually the main explanation for the slight 
improvement in profit margins in the service 
sector that year.  
¾ Due to differences in trade exposure and 
probably also in competitive pressures and 
pricing power, the two sectors registered quite 
different developments in final prices during 
the downturn. In the past two years, the 
deflator of value added increased much more 
rapidly in the service sector than in industry. 
Although a slight pick-up of wages also played 
a role, most of the deterioration in profit 
margins in industry in 2003 can be attributed 
to the euro appreciation. 
Graph 21: Labour productivity by sectors, euro area  
(year-on-year growth in %) 
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Source: Commission services. 
 
Graph 22: Nominal wages by sectors,(1) euro area  
(year-on-year growth in %) 
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(1) Total compensation per employee.  
Source: Commission services. 
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Large country differences in recent 
profitability developments  
Average euro-area developments in profitability 
mask significant country differences. Table 3 
displays the average change in the profit mark-up 
during the downturn for individual euro-area 
Member States. A small number of countries 
experienced an improvement in profitability over 
the period (Germany, Greece, Spain and Austria). 
A larger number registered a more or less 
pronounced deterioration (Belgium, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and 
Finland).  
Table 3: Changes in profits mark-up, euro area 
(2000-03 – average annual change in %) 
 Labour productivity 
Real 
wages 
Profit 
mark-up 
BE 0.6 1.6 -1.0 
DE 0.7 0.3 0.4 
EL 3.4 2.8 0.6 
ES 0.6 -0.3 0.8 
FR 0.4 0.7 -0.3 
IE 2.7 2.6 0.1 
IT -0.8 -0.4 -0.5 
LU -1.7 1.7 -3.3 
NL -0.4 0.7 -1.0 
AT 0.7 0.2 0.5 
PT 0.0 0.4 -0.3 
FI 1.0 2.0 -1.0 
EU12 0.3 0.3 0.0 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Some of the country differences in the recent 
profitability performance may be attributed to 
cyclical factors. The countries which have 
experienced a sharper downturn – as measured 
by the loss in output gap between 2000 and 2003 
– have also experienced a more pronounced 
deterioration in profitability, the main exception 
in this respect being Ireland. It is worth noting 
that the magnitude of the loss in output gap 
during the downturn can, to a large extent, be 
related to the size of the positive output gap at 
the peak of the cycle in 2000. Hence, there is 
some evidence that, in some Member States 
(Netherlands, Portugal and Finland), the profit 
erosion during the downturn is also the price to 
pay for a period of overheating in the late 1990s.  
However, the strength of the cycle is not the only 
factor and only goes part way to explaining 
differences in profitability performance between 
countries such as Germany, Spain and Austria 
(where the profit mark-up improved) and France, 
Italy and Belgium on the other (where it 
deteriorated). This suggests that medium-term 
and structural factors, particularly in relation to 
the labour market, also play an important role in 
explaining recent differences in profitability. 
Three additional points are worth stressing: 
¾ Whereas euro-area Member States generally 
registered a significant slowdown in output 
per worker during the downturn, Germany 
and Spain managed to maintain their 
(admittedly low) pre-downturn productivity 
performance over 2001-03.  
¾ Positive developments in the mark-up are not 
always a sign of economic strength. In Spain, 
gains in the profit mark-up during the 
downturn appear somewhat fragile insofar as 
they were achieved largely by pushing up final 
prices and at the expense of external 
competitiveness.  
¾ In several Member States nominal wages were 
slow to respond to the deceleration of activity 
(Belgium, Spain, France and the Netherlands). 
In Italy, nominal wages were slow to adjust to 
a particularly sharp slowdown in productivity. 
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3. The financial health of the private 
sector in the euro area 
Financial conditions exert a crucial influence on 
short- and medium-term developments in the real 
economy. Changes in the leverage of the private 
sector can have profound economic implications 
as was illustrated in recent years when the 
corporate sector reduced investment spending to 
restore its balance-sheets. This section reviews 
the current financial state of non-financial 
corporations, households and the banking sector 
and discusses the likely implications on the cycle.  
Clear improvements in the non-financial 
corporate sector… 
Over the last year the corporate sector has 
continued to benefit from low financing costs, 
allowing for further balance-sheet repair. 
Favourable financing conditions are visible in 
higher equity-prices and short- and long-term 
bank lending rates, which remain low in absolute 
levels and in real terms. Moreover, corporate 
bond spreads continue to move around historical 
lows (see Graph 23). 
Graph 23: Corporate bond spreads over government 
bonds, euro area (in basis points)  
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Source:  Datastream. 
In the past few years, the focus of companies has 
been mainly on debt-restructuring. The reduction 
of debt levels has been supported by the disposal 
of core assets and the use of higher cash balances 
to finance buy-back transactions. As a result of 
these efforts, the ratio of total debt to GDP of 
the non-financial corporate sector has started to 
decline since the second half of 2003. However, 
the decline has so far been limited and the overall 
level at around 65% of GDP remains high. 
Companies have also lengthened the average 
maturity of their liabilities (see Graph 24). With 
the exception of a short interval in the first two 
quarters of 2003, the ratio of short term debt to 
total debt has declined rapidly to 29.1% in the 
fourth quarter of 2003.  
Apart from debt reduction and restructuring, 
companies’ financial positions have benefited 
from a recovery in profitability. Higher profits 
were initially mainly generated by cost-cutting, 
but since mid-2003 also by rising revenues. These 
favourable developments do not so far extend to 
SMEs. Typically, SMEs have more difficulty in 
exploiting positive financial market conditions 
and benefit less from strong growth abroad. The 
latest ECB Bank Lending Survey however points 
to a substantial easing of standards for SMEs in 
the second quarter and a pronounced increase in 
loan demand.12 
Graph 24: Non-financial corporations’ debt level and 
maturity structure, euro area  
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Source: ECB. 
While the conditions for a sustained increase in 
investment seem to be in place, capital spending 
has been slower than expected. After a pick-up in 
the fourth quarter of last year, investment 
spending contracted again in the first quarter and 
stagnated in the second. This is one of the factors 
explaining the deceleration in bank borrowing 
and the net issuance of corporate bonds during 
the first half of the year (see Graph 25). The 
distribution of bond issuance suggests that 
                                                     
12 See July 2004 ECB bank lending survey for the euro area. 
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another explanation may have been the fact that 
companies anticipated higher interest rates in 
2004 and moved some of their issuance forward 
to 2003.  
Overall, the financial situation of the corporate 
sector has clearly improved over the last two 
years. Financial conditions are unlikely to 
constrain investment demand, as evidenced by an 
unusually large amount of liquid financial assets 
in companies’ balance sheets. The source of the 
current weakness in investment is therefore 
probably more related to uncertainties about 
medium-term demand. 
Graph 25: Non-financial corporations’ financing, euro 
area (annual growth rates in %) 
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Source: ECB. 
The financial behaviour of the corporate sector 
has nevertheless differed substantially across 
Member States. In Germany, companies have run 
financial surpluses in both 2002 and 2003, which 
were largely achieved by cutting investment. In 
France and Italy, on the other hand, companies 
continued to be net borrowers. 
…while the situation in the household sector 
has not changed 
The increase of household debt in recent years 
has raised worries about the possible effects on 
private consumption. Historically low interest 
rates have supported the continued expansion of 
household borrowing, which is mostly related to 
house purchases. While total household 
borrowing in the euro area grew in the first two 
quarters of 2004 by almost 7% on an annual 
basis, mortgage lending in the same period 
showed an increase of nearly 9% (see Graph 26).  
Graph 26: Bank loans to households,(1) euro area 
(annual growth rates in %) 
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(1) MFI sector only.  
Source: ECB. 
 
Graph 27: Household debt, euro area  
(as a % of GDP) 
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Source:  ECB. 
The stock of household debt now exceeds 80% 
of disposable income and 53% of GDP. By 
international standards, these levels are not 
particularly high. The degree of dispersion within 
the euro area, however, is considerable with 
debt/disposable income ratios varying between 
33% in Italy and 203% in the Netherlands. These 
high levels of indebtedness have so far not raised 
solvency concerns: the net worth of households 
is generally positive and debt-servicing costs have 
been limited due to low interest rates. 
Nevertheless, with the rising share of mortgages 
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with flexible interest rates, the potential impacts 
of a sharp rise in interest rates on households’ 
mortgage payments has become greater. 
Rapid house price inflation has continued in 
recent years in the euro area as a whole. House 
prices rose by more than 7% in both 2002 and 
2003. In some Member States, house prices have 
already peaked and growth rates are now clearly 
decelerating. In these countries, e.g. in the 
Netherlands, a negative wealth effect may be 
dampening household spending. Looking ahead, 
country-specific factors play a significant role in 
the outlook for house prices. They include the 
degree of overvaluation of current prices, the 
evolution of supply and demand for houses and 
the sensitivity of house prices to higher interest 
rates.  
Overall, the vulnerability of the household sector 
to adverse movement in house prices and interest 
rates is greater than in the past. Nevertheless, the 
risks from house price inflation to the euro area 
as a whole are limited, as price increases in the 
larger euro-area Member States have been 
moderate. Moreover, the structure of household 
liabilities limits the vulnerability to a rise in 
interest rates. Nevertheless, a decline in house 
prices or a sharp deceleration in the growth of 
house prices in individual Member States with an 
overvaluation in the housing market will weaken 
private consumption through the wealth effect.  
Graph 28: Residential property prices, euro area  
(annual change in % 1999 - 2003) 
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(1) Data for 2002 instead of 2003. 
Source: ECB. 
The banking sector has proven to be resilient 
to shocks 
During the economic downturn the banking 
sector suffered from a decline in profitability due 
to increases in loan-loss provisions and falling 
non-interest income. Profitability remained above 
the levels of the mid-1990s, as it was supported 
by buoyant retail lending activity in many 
Member States and by restructuring. The 
economic recovery and favourable financial 
market conditions have led to a recovery in non-
interest income and a decline in provisioning. 
Though declining slightly, solvency ratios have 
remained robust, with average regulatory capital 
ratios around 11%.  
Developments in market indicators confirm the 
improvement in the health of the banking sector. 
The sector’s credit ratings have improved with 
the balance of those banks that have been 
upgraded and those that have been downgraded 
moving from negative to balance. Indices of bank 
share prices have performed in line with total 
market indices. Other indicators of risk such as 
credit default swap premia fell substantially in 
2003 even for those institutions for which they 
had risen substantially in the years before, and 
have remained low in the first half of 2004.  
Loan provisions to the SME sector, which shows 
still increasing insolvencies, pose a limited risk to 
the banking sector. High levels of household debt 
and high house prices do not form a threat to 
financial stability risk for the banking sector, but 
could lead to a slowdown in interest income 
when mortgage lending decelerates from the 
current high growth rates. In sharp contrast to 
residential property prices, commercial property 
prices fell in 2003 in practically all industrialised 
countries.  However, these price declines remain 
limited by historical standards. Property 
borrowing has continued to grow rapidly in some 
Member States, but banks seem to have adopted 
a more cautious attitude towards lending for 
commercial development.13  
In light of the shocks experienced since 2000, the 
banking sector has shown considerable 
                                                     
13 See BIS Annual Report 2004.  
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resilience.14 Banks could continue to re-assess the 
way they price credit risk, with negative 
implications for some classes of borrowers. In 
the medium term, this process should foster a 
better allocation of resources and is unlikely to be 
a drag on aggregate investment. 
 
                                                     
14  See ECB Monthly Bulletin of July 2004. 
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Focus 
II. The pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy in EMU 
The ECOFIN Council has reiterated on several occasions its commitment to pursuing a symmetrical approach to fiscal 
policy through budgetary discipline in good times, with the objective of gradually achieving budgetary surpluses. This is in line 
with the spirit of the EU fiscal framework which is designed to let the automatic stabilisers operate freely throughout the 
cycle thus avoiding pro-cyclical fiscal policies. However, discretionary fiscal policy has tended to be pro-cyclical throughout the 
past decades, mainly on the revenue side, being tighter during downturns and looser during cyclical upturns, thereby reducing 
the effectiveness of automatic fiscal stabilisation. The EU fiscal framework has not completely eliminated the pro-cyclical 
bias of fiscal policy for the euro-area as a whole. Its persistence in the euro area is mainly attributable to countries that are 
not close-to-balance or in surplus over the cycle as the SGP prescribes. Euro-area countries with larger deficits tend to have a 
more pro-cyclical stance both in good times and in bad times. Since 1999, this has been especially pronounced in good times. 
A more thorough analysis indicates that sustainability concerns, associated with developments in government debt are a key 
determinant of the fiscal policy stance. Governments consolidate more in downturns than in upturns. This is particularly 
because spending increases in a context of high budget deficits raise more concerns about sustainability and may be perceived 
more negatively by the public (the voters) than doing so when the budget posts a surplus or only a small deficit. The 
unfolding recovery provides an opportunity to break with the past pro-cyclical pattern and to ensure that the necessary 
margin of manoeuvre is created for the next downturn. Thus the temptation should be resisted to use budgetary “windfall” 
gains to increase spending or to cut taxes.  
1.  Introduction  
On 18 June 2004, the European Council 
adopted a Declaration on the Stability and 
Growth Pact. One of the elements that the 
Declaration addressed was the conduct of 
budgetary policy over the cycle and - in 
particular – the need to actively use periods of 
economic recovery to enhance the budgetary 
position: “The Conference agrees that Member States 
should use periods of economic recovery actively to 
consolidate public finances and improve their budgetary 
positions.  The objective is to gradually achieve a 
budgetary surplus in good times which creates the 
necessary room to accommodate economic downturns and 
thus contribute to the long-term sustainability of public 
finances.” In its Communication of 3 September 
2004 on “Strengthening economic governance 
and clarifying the implementation of the 
Stability and Growth Pact”, the European 
Commission also stressed “the need to conduct 
prudent and symmetric-over-the-cycle policies and achieve 
surpluses in good times”. 
A recovery is underway in 2004 and is set to 
continue in 2005. Previous upswings, in 
particular in 1999-2000 but also before the start 
of EMU, were characterised by pro-cyclical 
fiscal policy behaviour, which worsened the 
underlying situation of public finances and led 
to an unfavourable policy mix. It also hampered 
fiscal stabilisation in the subsequent downturn. 
An analysis of fiscal behaviour and the factors 
underlying pro-cyclical policies can provide 
insight into how to avoid repeating mistakes of 
the past.  
In this context, this Focus section analyses 
developments of the budget deficit and the 
fiscal stance throughout the cycle. The 
development of the aggregate budget balances 
over the cycle is important from two 
 
Graph 29: Fiscal stance in the euro-area Member 
States – Changes in cyclically-adjusted primary 
balances and output gap (1994-2003 – in % of GDP) 
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perspectives: sustainability of public finances 
and the role of aggregate budget balances in 
stabilising the economy.  
2. Theoretical explanations for the pro-
cyclical bias 
Explanations for the pro-cyclical fiscal policy 
bias are extensive in the economic literature.15 
Most have either an institutional or political 
economy origin and differentiate between 
explanations for pro-cyclical policy in 
downturns and upturns. Below, some 
explanations are discussed.  
Uncertainty and erroneous forecasts  
The overall fiscal stance may turn out to be pro-
cyclical, even when it is not intended to be so. 
Trend or potential output, and consequently 
output gaps, may be measured and forecast 
erroneously. Procedures for calculating fiscal 
aggregates on a cyclically-adjusted basis are 
prone to a high degree of uncertainty and 
subject to ex-post adjustment. Policymakers 
may therefore be unable, at the time, to 
distinguish budgetary changes of a structural 
nature from those which are driven by 
automatic stabilisers. In particular, potential 
output growth may be overestimated during 
periods of buoyant economic activity, implying 
a higher output gap than accounted for, a higher 
cyclical component of the budget balances and 
an overestimation of the strength of the 
cyclically-adjusted balance and revenue base in 
the longer term. The misperception of 
structurally higher revenues may trigger 
unsustainable tax cuts and expenditure increases 
during upswings. When the potential growth 
rates and output gap estimates are adjusted 
downward ex-post, the fiscal stance will appear 
to have been pro-cyclical and the resulting 
cyclically-adjusted balance will have 
deteriorated. 
Moreover, deviations in the budget balances 
may be temporary, even though they are not 
cyclical due to fluctuations in the elasticity of 
tax revenues. The erroneous diagnosis of 
                                                     
15  OECD Economic Outlook No 74 (2003) provides an 
overview and tests several explanations empirically.  
cyclical or temporary revenue increases as 
structural will inflate revenue forecasts, and 
subsequent shortfalls during downturns may 
only be remedied pro-cyclically.  
Forni and Momigliano (2004)16 find evidence 
that reliance on the information actually 
available to policy-makers in real time is 
important for the assessment of past policies. 
They show that estimating fiscal policy rules 
based on ex-post revised data tend to give a 
misleading picture of the sensitivity of 
intentional discretionary policies to cyclical 
conditions. Using ex-ante estimates of the 
output gaps which were available at the time, 
captures the intentions of the government much 
better. They suggest that an overoptimistic 
assessment of the state of the economy in 
European countries around the cyclical peak of 
2000 was a cause for the deterioration of 
budgetary positions.  
Political economy, fiscal rules and 
institutional issues 
Various authors discuss political economy 
reasons for the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy, 
including nominal balanced budget rules in 
lower levels of government, the constraints 
imposed by the EU fiscal framework and 
incumbent influential groups trying to influence 
voting patterns.17  
Even if borrowing is not constrained by forces 
such as balanced budget rules, governments 
may respond less forcefully to downturns than 
to upturns because spending increases in a 
context of high budget deficits raise more 
concerns about sustainability and may be 
perceived more negatively by the public (the 
voters) than doing so when the budget posts a 
surplus. In particular, sustainability concerns, 
associated with indebtedness and increasing 
indebtedness are a key determinant of fiscal 
tightening during downturns, as illustrated by the 
analysis in Box 3.  
                                                     
16  Forni, L. and S. Momigliano (2004), “Cyclical Sensitivity of 
Fiscal Policies Based on Real-time Data”, mimeo. 
17  Lane, P and A. Tornell (1999): “Voracity and Growth in 
Discrete Time”, Economics Letters, Vol. 62, No 1 
(January 1999): pp 139-145. 
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Political institutions also matter, and undesirable 
pro-cyclical retrenchment seems less prevalent 
in countries with more politically fragmented 
governments and electoral systems based on 
proportional representation and coalitions, 
rather than plurality. One reason for this may be 
that coalition governments need to rely on ex-
ante agreed budgetary commitments for the 
term of the government, while one-party 
governments may set their budgets more 
discretionary on an annual basis. Moreover, pro-
cyclical fiscal loosening appears to be more 
common in election years,18 highlighting the 
importance of political incentives as an 
explanatory factor for the pro-cyclical policy 
bias. The increase in spending before elections 
is more attractive in upswings than in 
downswings, when sustainability concerns may 
reduce spending incentives.   
Certain types of fiscal rules, particularly those 
requiring actual, rather than cyclically-adjusted, 
budgets to be in balance, automatically damp 
cyclical fluctuations in the budget balance. They 
restrict the ability of the government to let 
automatic stabilisers work freely and 
symmetrically in tandem with fluctuations in 
economic activity, leading to pro-cyclical 
budgeting. 
Evidence for the United States for example, 
where the individual states have had a variety of 
balanced budget rules, suggests that rules-
induced pro-cyclicality is fairly common. It can, 
however, be mitigated by accumulating “rainy 
day” funds in good times.19 This is in line with 
the spirit of the EU fiscal framework in which 
surpluses in good times are required. When 
nominal budget rules are accompanied by a 
nominal cap on expenditure growth, the pro-
cyclical upward drift in spending during upturns 
is curbed. Conversely, sharing the revenues with 
sub-national levels of government may result in 
pro-cyclicality, particularly if sub-national 
governments account for a large share of total 
                                                     
18  Buti and Van den Noord (2004) find a significant impact 
of elections in euro-area countries in 1999-2002 on the 
pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy (‘Fiscal policy in EMU: 
Rules, discretion and political incentives’, European 
Commission, DG ECFIN Economic Paper, No. 206). 
19  Sorensen and Yosha, “Is State Fiscal Policy Asymmetric 
Over the Business Cycle?”, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City Economic Review, 3rd Quarter 2001. 
government spending and revenue, and are not 
allowed to run budget deficits. 
The EU fiscal framework embedded in the 
Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
has been under close scrutiny on the grounds 
that it may have contributed to an increased 
pro-cyclical bias in the euro-area wide fiscal 
stance. The IMF (World Economic Outlook 
October 2004) and the OECD (Economic 
Outlook No 74, 2003) confirm, however, that 
constraints imposed by the EU fiscal framework 
have not created a discernibly pro-cyclical bias 
during downturns in the euro-area as a whole. 
Discretionary shifts in fiscal stance, measured 
by the primary budget balance, seem to have 
become less pro-cyclical after the start of EMU. 
In particular, the policy stance became less 
countercyclical in bad times. However, while 
pro-cyclical fiscal tightening in bad times was 
reduced, it has not been balanced by additional 
deficit reduction in good times, so that a deficit 
bias may have re-emerged.    
3. Budgetary developments and the 
cycle since 1994  
Distinguishing between the automatic and 
discretionary components of fiscal policy  
How has fiscal policy behaved de facto in 
EMU? Graph 30 shows that aggregate budget 
balances for the euro area and cyclical 
developments – reflected by the output gap – 
have generally moved in the same direction.  
Graph 30: Nominal budget balances (1) and the output 
gap, euro area (1970-2003 – in % of GDP) 
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This link between cyclical and budgetary 
developments becomes clearer when looking at 
the changes in the output gap. These reflect the 
annual difference between actual and potential 
growth. Graph 31 shows a significant positive 
correlation between changes in the euro-area 
budget balances and changes in the output 
gap.20 These developments of public finances 
over the cycle can be split into an automatic 
and a discretionary component. 
Graph 31: Development of euro-area budget balances 
(1) versus changes in the output gap (in % of GDP) 
1996
1997
2003
2000
1999
1998
2002
2001
R2 = 0.507
-2
-1
0
1
2
-2.0 -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Change in output gap
Ch
an
ge
 in
 bu
dg
et 
ba
lan
ce
s
 
(1) Excluding UMTS proceeds. 
Source:  Commission services. 
On the revenue side, the automatic changes 
stem from the correlation between the tax base 
(income, consumption, wealth) and the cycle. 
On the expenditure side, social security benefits 
move with economic developments. The 
cyclical component21 of the development of the 
budget balances - by definition - mutes 
deviations of actual growth from potential, i.e. 
the working of the automatic stabilisers. 
Brunilla, Buti and In’t Veld (2002)22 find that 
                                                     
20  The scatter diagrams in this section illustrate the 
occurrence of pro-cyclical policy in EMU; they do not, 
however, give a causal relationship between the cyclical 
situation and the fiscal policy reaction. 
21 The cyclical or automatic component of the changes in 
the budget balances is commonly estimated by 
multiplying the output gap by the sensitivity of the 
budget balance to the cycle. The result is a measure of 
the part of the budget balance that is explained by the 
deviation of output from its potential level. 
22 Brunila A., Buti M. and J. in’t Veld (2002), “Fiscal policy 
in Europe: how effective are automatic stabilisers?”, 
European Commission, DG ECFIN Economic Paper, No. 
177. 
the automatic stabilisers smooth around 30% of 
GDP fluctuations caused by private 
consumption shocks.23  
A common measure of discretionary fiscal 
policy is the cyclically-adjusted primary balance 
(CAPB). The cyclical component of the budget 
and interest expenditures are deducted from 
budget balances: what is left summarises 
budgetary components that are under the 
control of fiscal authorities and that change as a 
result of new policy measures.  
The discretionary component may be pro- or 
counter-cyclical, intended or unintended to 
strengthen or weaken the stabilising effect of 
the automatic stabilisers.  
There has been growing scepticism on the 
intentional use of discretionary fiscal policy for 
cyclical purposes: long and uncertain time lags, 
institutional constraints and irreversibility of 
fiscal decisions hamper the effectiveness of 
fiscal fine-tuning of the economy. As the 
drawbacks of fiscal demand management 
became more apparent, the focus of fiscal 
policy gradually shifted to sustainability and 
quality of public finances, also in the context of 
ageing populations. 
Graph 32: The EU fiscal framework over the cycle 
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Source:  Commission services. 
Therefore, the EU fiscal framework has been 
designed to let the automatic stabilisers operate 
freely as shown in Graph 32. Over the cycle, the 
                                                     
23 The smoothing effect is estimated to be much lower in 
the case of investment shocks, export demand shocks 
and productivity shocks. 
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budgetary position should be in balance, as 
reflected by an unchanged cyclically-adjusted 
balance (CAB). The budget balances should 
than automatically show a surplus position in 
good times, when the output gap is positive and 
a deficit position when the output gap is 
negative. Discretionary changes in the aggregate 
budget balances should be mainly targeted at 
reaching and maintaining the medium-term 
objective of ‘close-to-balance or in surplus’ over 
the cycle.  
The conduct of discretionary fiscal policy in 
the euro area  
Has discretionary fiscal policy behaved along 
the lines intended by the fiscal framework? This 
section will look into the behaviour of the fiscal 
stance. 
 
Graph 33: Automatic and discretionary annual 
changes in the euro-area budget deficit (1)  
(in % of GDP) 
-1.5
-0.5
0.5
1.5
2.5
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
automatic discretionary Change in deficit
 
(1) The discretionary component of the change in the budget 
balance is represented by the change in the Cyclically-Adjusted 
Primary Balances (CAPB). The automatic component is 
represented by the difference between the actual annual change in 
the budget balance and the CAPB.  Deficits exclude UMTS. 
Source:  Commission services. 
Graph 33 shows that since 1994, the 
discretionary component of the change in the 
budget deficit has reinforced the working of the 
automatic stabilisers in 5 out of the 10 years. 
Considering that the steady state of close-to-
balance or in surplus has not been achieved in 
all countries, a tightening fiscal stance, reflected 
by a positive change in the discretionary 
component over the cycle, should have been 
realised. Instead, since 2000, a deterioration has 
been observed. 
Graph 34: Fiscal policy stance measured against 
change in the output gap 
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Source: Commission services. 
This is also reflected in Graph 34, which shows 
no correlation between the changes in the 
output gap (i.e. the difference between actual 
and potential growth in a specific year) and the 
cyclically-adjusted primary balance. However, 
considering the level of the output gap rather 
than the changes in the output gap reveals a 
significant pro-cyclical bias of the fiscal policy 
stance, both in good times and in bad times. 
Data points in the bottom-right quadrant of 
Graph 35 reflect years of pro-cyclical fiscal 
loosening and data points in the upper-left 
quadrant indicate pro-cyclical tightening. 
Graph 35: Fiscal policy stance measured against the 
output gap 
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Source: Commission services. 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area III/2004 
 
 
 
- 32 - 
 - 
4.  Some characteristics of the pro-
cyclical nature of discretionary fiscal 
policy  
To gain better understanding of the underlying 
forces, more analysis of the nature of the pro-
cyclical bias and its characteristics is needed. 
Has it mainly been induced by discretionary 
changes in revenue or expenditure? Do the 
aggregate developments for the euro area reflect 
common practice amongst Member States, or is 
the sample blurred by different behaviour in 
groups of Member States? Is the pro-cyclical 
behaviour of fiscal policy stronger in good times 
or in bad times?    
Revenue and expenditure  
Graphs 36 and 37 show that the aggregate pro-
cyclical bias stems largely from the revenue side: 
both tax cuts and tax increases contributed to 
pro-cyclicality. In particular changes in direct tax 
revenue (adjusted for the cycle) tend to correlate 
negatively with changes in the output gap. 
Graph 36: Discretionary changes in expenditure 
measured against the output gap 
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Source: Commission services. 
This is in line with the findings of the OECD 
(Economic Outlook No 74, 2003) that tax cuts 
are at the heart of pro-cyclicality. They argue 
that the public reaction to high tax rates 
provides a strong political incentive for funds 
generated during upturns to be used to make 
tax cuts as economies approach their cyclical 
peaks. Moreover, as argued in section 2, high 
revenues may be mistakenly perceived to be 
permanent and returned to the tax payer. Pro-
cyclical retrenchment is then required in bad 
times when budget balances deteriorate and 
sustainability concerns rise.   
Graph 37: Discretionary changes in revenue measured 
against the output gap 
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Source: Commission services. 
Country-level data  
The aggregate developments at euro-area level 
may hide certain developments and relations 
which are due to country-differences.  
Looking at country-level data provides more 
insight into the origin of the pro-cyclical bias. 
Graphs 38 and 39 split the data into two 
groups. In the first group, the cyclically-adjusted 
deficit (CAB) is smaller than 2 % of GDP, i.e. 
they are relatively close to having achieved 
balanced budgets over the cycle. This group 
identifies the countries that have – in the year in 
which they belong to this group – a certain 
margin vis-à-vis the 3% of GDP reference value 
for the budget balance of the EU fiscal 
framework and are either close-to-balance or in 
surplus over the cycle or not far from it. In this 
group, the behaviour of the fiscal stance does 
not show any systematic link with the output 
gap. This is in line with the spirit of the SGP, 
i.e. to let the automatic stabilisers play freely 
around a budgetary position of close-to-balance 
or in surplus over the cycle and a rather 
constant cyclically-adjusted primary balance.  
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Graph 38: Fiscal policy stance in countries with small 
cyclically-adjusted deficits (1) or surpluses (1994-2003) 
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(1) Cyclically-adjusted deficits below 2% of GDP. 
Source: Commission services. 
The second group is composed of data points 
for which the cyclically-adjusted deficit is larger 
than 2 % of GDP, meaning that they are close 
to the 3% reference value of the SGP. In this 
group the data appears clustered in the upper-
left and lower-right quadrants, reflecting a pro-
cyclical policy bias.  
Graph 39: Fiscal policy stance in countries with 
significant cyclically-adjusted deficits (1) (1994-2003) 
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(1) Cyclically-adjusted deficits above 2% of GDP. 
Source: Commission services. 
After the SGP came into force in 1999, a more 
countercyclical stance could have been expected 
in the good times in this group than in the other 
group of countries, considering that more 
progress is needed to achieve a medium-term 
position of close-to-balance or in surplus. This 
second group could have been expected to 
show a pro-cyclical policy in the downturns, 
when the output gap is negative, in order to 
reduce sustainability concerns and avoid or 
correct any breach of the 3% of GDP reference 
value for the budget balance.  Remarkably, this 
has not been the case, as reflected in graphs 40 
and 41. Graph 41 shows that, since 1999, there 
have been virtually no data points in the upper-
right quadrant, i.e. little or no fiscal 
retrenchment has been undertaken in countries 
that most need progress towards medium-term 
positions of close-to-balance or in surplus. The 
cyclically-adjusted budgetary position that 
showed on average no change in the first group, 
deteriorated in the second group. This implies 
that the underlying situation in these countries 
actually worsened and that the divergence 
between countries adhering to the spirit of the 
SGP and the other group has increased.  
Graph 40: Fiscal policy stance in countries with small 
cyclically-adjusted deficits (1) or surpluses (1999-2003) 
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(1) Cyclically-adjusted deficits below 2% of GDP. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Graph 41: Fiscal policy stance in countries with 
significant cyclically-adjusted deficits (1) (1999-2003) 
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(1) Cyclically-adjusted deficits above 2% of GDP. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Symmetry over the cycle 
Box 3 illustrates results from an analysis on 
panel data. The results presented in the Box 
indicate that the response of fiscal policy to 
cyclical conditions is non-symmetric. It is 
dependent on the starting cyclical conditions. In 
weak cyclical phases (negative output gap) an 
increase in the output gap leads to an 
improvement in the CAPB, while in phases with 
a positive output gap, a deterioration of the 
CAPB is more likely. This is an indication that 
pro-cyclical loosening in good times is at the 
root of problems of missing stabilisation 
opportunities via fiscal policy in the euro area.  
Box 3 also confirms that the introduction of the 
EU fiscal framework did not lead fiscal policy to 
become more pro-cyclical.  Prima facie evidence 
pointed to stronger pro-cyclical behaviour due 
to the EU fiscal framework. However, once the 
analysis includes a variable for the level of debt, 
the response of CAPBs to output gaps becomes 
non-significant. These results indicate that debt 
levels and developments are an important 
determinant of the discretionary fiscal policy 
stance and are in line with IMF (2004).  
Box 3: Asymmetric response of discretionary fiscal policy to the cycle. Findings from the 
estimation of fiscal rules for the euro area 
 
A rigorous analysis of the impact of the cycle should be made by a model suited to analysing the behaviour of fiscal 
authorities. This is necessary to avoid omitting any relevant variables that contribute, together with the economic 
cycle, to determining changes in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance (CAPB). In recent years, it has become 
common practice to analyse the determinants of discretionary fiscal policy through the estimation of so-called 
‘fiscal rules’, summarising the behaviour of fiscal authorities.  The purpose of such analytical exercises is to identify 
a limited set of macroeconomic determinants that explain developments in measures of discretionary fiscal policy. 
Most of the fiscal rules that have been proposed so far in the literature find that the CAPB depends on the cyclical 
conditions of the economy and on debt levels. The idea is that fiscal authorities are motivated by objectives of 
output stabilization (so that budget balances should respond positively to output gaps) and debt stabilisation (so 
that a positive response of budget balances to the existing stock of debt is expected).  The output gap is generally 
used as a measure for the cycle, while the lagged debt/GDP ratio is normally used to capture the debt stabilisation 
motive of fiscal authorities. The lagged dependent variable (e.g., the primary budget balance) is normally included in 
the empirical specification to allow for a role of inertia in budgetary policy. 
Existing work estimating fiscal rules for EU countries has highlighted a number of relevant features: 
• There is no strong evidence of counter-cyclical discretionary fiscal policy for euro-area countries in the 
past decades. 
• After the introduction of the EU fiscal framework, fiscal policy did not become more pro-cyclical. 
• CAPBs are strongly and significantly positively affected by debt levels. 
• The effect of debt levels on the CAPB has become more pronounced since the introduction of the EU 
fiscal framework. 
In most of the analyses carried out so far, the cycle is assumed to exert a symmetric effect on budget balances. An 
additional point of output gap is considered as having the same impact on the budget balance both when the 
starting level of the output gap is negative and when it is positive. Similarly, no distinction is made for periods in 
which the output gap is falling or rising. However, as reported in Section 2, there are several reasons why the 
cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy may exhibit a non-symmetric pattern. One of the few exceptions is the analysis 
contained in OECD (2003). There, a particular specification of fiscal rule is estimated for a panel of OECD 
countries, which distinguishes between the impact of the cycle in downturns (falling output gap) and upturns (rising 
output gap). Results show that, while for the overall sample fiscal policy is (weakly) pro-cyclical, the behaviour of 
fiscal policy becomes weakly counter-cyclical when restricting the sample to the periods in which the output gap is 
falling (downturns). This evidence is consistent with the view that the occurrence of pro-cyclical fiscal policy is 
mainly related to pro-cyclical loosening during upturns rather than to fiscal policy tightening during downturns. 
The aim here is to test for possible asymmetries in the response of discretionary fiscal policy to the cycle, focusing 
the analysis to euro-area countries and taking into account the presence of the EU fiscal framework. Compared 
with the analysis provided in OECD (2003), the analysis is based on the estimation of a type of fiscal rule in line 
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with those commonly found in the literature (e.g., Galì and Perotti (2003), Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay (2002). 
Moreover, the control for the asymmetry of the cycle is performed differently compared with OECD (2003). 
There, the distinction is made between periods of falling and rising output gap. In the following analysis, the 
distinction is made instead between periods of positive and negative output gap. This definition better captures the 
occurrence of conditions in which revenues (expenditures) are below (above) levels associated with the economy 
working to its potential, so that the contribution of the cycle to the budget balance is negative. 
The next table reports the results for panel data estimation of fiscal rules across EU-11 countries. Annual data for 
the period 1970-2003 are taken from the AMECO database. The dependent variable is the primary cyclically-
adjusted budget balance. The explanatory variables included are the output gap, the 1-year lagged debt/GDP ratio 
and the lagged dependent variable.  To avoid an issue of endogeneity of the output gap (i.e. the fact that not only 
the output gap affects budget variables but also that budgetary policy has an impact on the cycle), the output gap as 
an explanatory variable is used with a 1-year lag.  
 
The response of the primary CAB to cyclical conditions: 
estimation of fiscal rules in a panel of euro-area countries (EU-11, 1970-2003): 
a) Average response of fiscal policy to the output gap 
 Debt variable not included among explanatory factors 
Debt variable included among explanatory 
factors 
 1970-2003 1994-2003 1970-2003 1994-2003 
OG(-1) -0.048 (-1.45) 
-0.09** 
(-2.06) 
0.002 
(0.009) 
0.054 
(0.089) 
Debt/GDP(-1)   
0.029*** 
(7.34) 
0.064*** 
(3.57) 
PCAB(-1) 0.85*** (29.77) 
0.58*** 
(7.92) 
0.74*** 
(24.29) 
0.47*** 
(6.25) 
Constant   -1.45*** (-6.27) 
-3.29** 
(-2.59) 
Number of 
observations 363 110 348 110 
R square within groups 0.72 0.4 0.77 0.47 
R square between 
groups 0.99 0.98 0.72 0.79 
F test 469 33.61 366.33 29.37 
 
b) Response of fiscal policy to output gaps distinguishing between weak and strong phases of the cycle 
 
 Debt variable not included among explanatory 
factors 
Debt variable included among explanatory 
factors 
 1970-2003 1994-2003 1970-2003 1994-2003 
OG(-1) 
-0.097* 
(-1.9) 
-0.137 
(-1.47) 
-0.056 
(-1.15) 
0.017 
(0.018) 
OG(-1)*DOG<0 0.095 
(1.26) 
0.07 
(0.5) 
0.11 
(1.6) 
0.068 
(0.49) 
Debt/GDP(-1)   0.03*** (7.4) 
0.064*** 
(3.55) 
PCAB(-1) 0.85*** 
(29.79) 
0.58*** 
(7.67) 
0.75*** 
(24.34) 
0.47*** 
(6.07) 
Constant 0.2** 
(2.17) 
1.2*** 
(4.65) 
-1.38*** 
(-5.9) 
-3.22*** 
(-2.51) 
Number of observ. 363 110 348 110 
R square within groups 0.72 0.41 0.76 0.47 
R square betw. groups 0.99 0.99 0.71 0.78 
F test 313.73 22.31 276.6 21.9 
 
N.B. Estimation method fixed effect panel regression. The output gap variable is instrumented using its own lag and the lagged US output gap. 
All variables are expressed as a percentage of trend output. 
T statistics reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at, respectively, 1, 5, and 10% level. 
OG=output gap; PCAB=primary CAB; DOG<0=dummy with a value of 1 if current output gap is negative. -1 in parentheses indicates that the 
variable is taken with a 1-year lag. 
Source:  Commission services.  
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The top half of the table (Part a) presents results concerning the average response of fiscal policy to the cycle 
without distinguishing between the different responses in weak or strong phases of the economic cycle. Estimates 
are shown with and without including the lagged debt as an explanatory variable, in order to help understand to 
what extent controlling for debt levels may alter the results. Regressions are also run separately for the whole 1970-
2003 period and for the 1994-2003 sub-period, coinciding with the years following phase II of EMU, taken as the 
start of the working of the EU fiscal framework. 
The regression results show that, in all cases, the CAPB exhibits a great deal of persistency (captured by a high, 
positive  and significant value for the coefficient for the lagged dependent variable), even if there is a considerable 
reduction in the degree of persistency after the introduction of the fiscal framework. There is evidence of a 
significant positive impact of debt levels on the CAPB, which becomes stronger after the introduction of the EU 
fiscal framework. As far as the response of the CAPB to the output gap is concerned, regression results show that, 
without controlling for debt levels, the coefficient for the output gap is negative and significant if the sample is 
restricted to the years following 1993. However, when debt is included among the explanatory variables, the 
coefficient for the output gap turns positive and becomes highly insignificant, irrespective of the sub-period 
considered. This means that the prima facie evidence of overall pro-cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy (captured by 
a negative regression coefficient for the output gap variable) depends crucially upon the omission of debt levels 
among the determinants of CAPBs. Once the analysis controls for the level of debt, the response of CAPBs to 
output gaps becomes non-significant. 
The bottom half of the table (Part b) distinguishes the impact of the cycle on discretionary fiscal policy depending 
on whether the initial output is negative or positive. In order to operate this distinction, an additional explanatory 
variable is introduced, consisting of the output gap multiplied by a dummy variable with a value of 1 when the 
lagged output gap is negative (weak initial cyclical conditions) and 0 otherwise. The regression coefficient for the 
output gap must be interpreted in this regression as the response to the cycle when cyclical conditions are strong. 
The coefficient for the output gap multiplied by the dummy is interpreted instead as the difference between the 
coefficient when cyclical conditions are weak and the coefficient when cyclical conditions are strong. If this 
coefficient is significantly different from zero, then this should be taken as evidence that the impact of the cycle is 
non-symmetric. If the coefficient is positive, discretionary fiscal policy is more counter-cyclical when the cycle is 
weak, the opposite being the case if the coefficient is negative. 
Results show that in all cases the coefficient for the output gap variable interacting with the dummy is positive, 
indicating a stronger pro-cyclical response of fiscal policy in good times. Controlling for the debt level, for the 
overall period, the coefficient for the output gap is negative when cyclical conditions are strong and positive when 
they are weak. Restricting the analysis to years following 1993, it appears that the coefficient of the output gap is 
more strongly positive when cyclical conditions are weak. These results are broadly consistent with the view that 
the response of fiscal policy to cyclical conditions is non-symmetric, being dependent on the starting cyclical 
conditions. In weak cyclical phases (negative output gap) an increase in the output gap is more likely to lead to an 
improvement in the primary CAB, i.e., fiscal policy is more likely to be counter-cyclical. This is an indication that 
pro-cyclical loosening in good times is at the root of problems of missing stabilisation opportunities via fiscal policy 
in the euro area. 
 
References:   
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5.   Conclusion  
Fiscal policy plays an important role in the 
stabilisation of output and inflation in the euro 
area. In particular, the automatic fiscal stabilisers 
are large and lead to oscillations in the budget 
balances over the cycle. However, the behaviour 
of discretionary fiscal policy tends to be pro-
cyclical, being tighter during downturns and 
looser during cyclical upturns, thereby reducing 
the effectiveness of automatic fiscal stabilisation. 
The pro-cyclicality stems mainly from tax cuts in 
good times using temporary budgetary windfall 
gains. During downturns these unfunded tax cuts 
require pro-cyclical retrenchment.  
The EU fiscal framework promotes the full 
working of the automatic stabilisers in good times 
and in bad times. Looking ahead, to the extent 
that the aggregate euro-area cyclically-adjusted 
budget deficit is brought down from its current 
level towards balance, fiscal rules would allow the 
full working of the automatic stabilisers and avoid 
the need for a recourse to pro-cyclical fiscal 
tightening in bad times.  
If the results of the analysis of the period 1994-
2003 presented in this focus are projected into 
the future, an improvement in the cyclically-
adjusted primary balances can be expected in the 
initial phases of the recovery. The main challenge 
will be to curb spending pressures and unfunded 
tax cuts in the later stages of the recovery. It will 
be crucial to resist incentives to spend budgetary 
windfall gains and address fiscal problems in 
order to prepare for the next economic downturn 
and to ensure sustainability in the long run in the 
light of ageing populations.  
Enforced national expenditure rules, based on 
prudent growth assumptions, help to counteract 
forces leading to pro-cyclical fiscal policy in good 
times and thus prevent the need to retrench in 
bad times. In addition, more emphasis on debt 
reduction in the EU fiscal framework may also 
contribute to fiscal stabilisation and reduce the 
pro-cyclical bias. 
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http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers210_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 211.  
Rainer Wichern 
Economics of the Common Agricultural Policy  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers211_en.htm  
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 212.  
Miriam Manchin  
Determinants of European cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers212_en.htm 
EUROPEAN ECONOMY. ECONOMIC PAPERS. No. 213.  
Hielke Buddelmeyer, Gilles Mourre and Melanie Ward  
The determinants of part-time work in EU countries: empirical investigations with macro-panel data 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/economic_papers/economicpapers213_en.htm 
3. Regular publications  
Euro area GDP indicator (Indicator-based forecast of quarterly GDP growth in the euro area) 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/euroareagdp_en.htm 
Business and Consumer Surveys (harmonised surveys for different sectors of the economies in the European 
Union (EU) and the applicant countries)  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/businessandconsumersurveys_en.htm 
Business Climate Indicator for the euro area (monthly indicator designed to deliver a clear and early assessment 
of the cyclical situation) 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/businessclimate_en.htm 
Key indicators for the euro area (presents the most relevant economic statistics concerning the euro area)  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/key_euro_area/keyeuroarea_en.htm 
Monthly and quarterly notes on the euro-denominated bond markets (looks at the volumes of debt issued, the 
maturity structures, and the conditions in the market) 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/bondmarkets_en.htm 
Price and Cost Competitiveness 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/priceandcostcompetiteveness_en.htm 
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IV. Key indicators for the euro area 
1 Output 2001 2002 2003* Apr-04 May-04 Jun-04 Jul-04 Aug-04 Sep-04
 Industrial confidence 1.1 Balance -10 -12 -5 -5 -4 -4 -4 -3
 Industrial production 1.2 mom % ch 0.2 -0.9 0.3 0.6 -0.2 0.4 
  2001 2002 2003* 03Q2 03Q3 03Q4 04Q1 04Q2 04Q3 
 Gross domestic product 1.3 Qtr. % ch -0.1 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.5 
2 Private consumption 2001 2002 2003* Apr-04 May-04 Jun-04 Jul-04 Aug-04 Sep-04
 Consumer confidence 2.1 Balance -6 -11 -14 -16 -14 -14 -14 -13
 Retail sales 2.2  mom % ch 1.3 1.3 1.6 -2.6 2.1 0.4 
  2001 2002 2003* 03Q2 03Q3 03Q4 04Q1 04Q2 04Q3 
 Private consumption 2.3 Qtr. % ch 1.8 0.6 1.7 -0.1 0.2 0.0 0.6 0.3 
3 Investment 2001 2002 2003* 03Q2 03Q3 03Q4 04Q1 04Q2 04Q3 
 Capacity utilization 3.1 % 83.5 81.2  80.7 80.3 80.9 80.5 80.6  
 Gross fixed capital formation 3.2 Qtr. % ch -0.3 -1.9 2.0 -0.3 0.0 0.8 -0.2 0.1  
 Change in stocks 3.3 % of GDP -0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.4 0.2 0.1 0  
4 Labour market 2001 2002 2003* Apr-04 May-04 Jun-04 Jul-04 Aug-04 Sep-04
 Unemployment 4.1 % 8.0 8.2 8.3 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0   
   2001 2002 2003* 03Q2 03Q3 03Q4 04Q1 04Q2 04Q3 
 Employment 4.2 Ann. % ch 1.4 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.03   
 Shortage of labour 4.3 % 7.8 3.8  3.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0  
 Wages 4.4 Ann. % ch 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.5 2.5     
5 International transactions  2001 2002 2003* Apr-04 May-04 Jun-04 Jul-04 Aug-04 Sep-04
 Export order books 5.1 Balance -14 -22  -13 -15 -11 -8 -9 -10 
 World trade 5.2 Bn. EUR 6454 6309        
 Exports of goods 5.3 Bn. EUR 767.4 776.9 823.4 93.6 92.9 100.0 99.8   
 Imports of goods 5.4 Bn. EUR 802.2 781.6 828.1 86 85.1 91.18 87.2   
 Trade balance 5.5 Bn. EUR -34.8 -4.7 -4.7 7.5 7.8 9.0 12.6   
   2001 2002 2003* 03Q2 03Q3 03Q4 04Q1 04Q2 04Q3 
 Exports of goods and services 5.6 Qtr. % ch 4.3 0.7 6.1 -0.9 2.5 0.4 1.4 3.7  
 Imports of goods and services 5.7 Qtr. % ch 2.1 -1.6 6.2 -0.5 1.3 1.9 0.3 2.9  
   2001 2002 2003* Apr-04 May-04 Jun-04 Jul-04 Aug-04 Sep-04
 Current account balance 5.8 Bn. EUR -12.3 9.6 11.0 8.8 6.0 0.4 1.8   
 Direct investment (net) 5.9 Bn. EUR -104.6 -90.4  -2.9 -1.6 -7.8 -8.3   
 Portfolio investment (net) 5.10 Bn. EUR 36.5 38.0  -3.0 -24.0 31.2 -30.5   
6 Prices  2001 2002 2003* Apr-04 May-04 Jun-04 Jul-04 Aug-04 Sep-04
 HICP 6.1 Ann. % ch 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.0 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.2 
 Core HICP 6.2 Ann. % ch 1.9 2.5 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.2  
 Producer prices 6.3 Ann. % ch 2.2 1.7  1.4 2.4 2.4 2.8   
 Import prices 6.4 Ann. % ch 102.2 102.4        
7 Monetary and financial indicators  2001 2002 2003* Apr-04 May-04 Jun-04 Jul-04 Aug-04 Sep-04
 Interest rate (3 months) 7.1 % p.a. 4.3 3.3  2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 
 Bond yield (10 years) 7.2 % p.a. 5.0 4.8  4.1 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.1 4.0 
 ECB repo rate 7.3  % p.a. 3.25 2.75  2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
 Stock markets 7.4  Index 4047 3053  2861 2729 2791 2730 2647 2749 
 M3 7.5 Ann. % ch 5.3 5.6  5.5 5.2 5.2    
 Credit to private sector (loans) 7.6 Ann. % ch 7.9 7.7  5.5 5.7 6.0 6.2   
 Exchange rate USD/EUR 7.7 Value 0.90 0.95 1.13 1.20 1.20 1.21 1.23 1.22 1.22 
 Nominal effective exchange rate 7.8 Index 91.5 95.1 106.2 107.0 108.6 108.4 108.9 108.7  
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Number Indicator Note Source 
1 Output   
1.1 Industrial confidence 
indicator  
Industry survey, average of balances to replies on production expectations, 
order books, and stocks (the latter with inverted sign) 
ECFIN 
1.2 Industrial production  Volume, excluding construction, wda Eurostat 
1.3 Gross domestic product  Volume (1995), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
2 Private consumption   
2.1 Consumer confidence 
indicator  
Consumer survey, average of balances to replies on four questions (financial 
and economic situation, unemployment, savings over next 12 months) 
ECFIN 
2.2 Retail sales Volume, excluding motor vehicles, wda Eurostat 
2.3 Private consumption Volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
3 Investment   
3.1 Capacity utilisation  In percent of full capacity, manufacturing, seasonally adjusted, survey data 
(collected in each January, April, July and October). 
ECFIN 
3.2 Gross fixed capital 
formation  
Volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
3.3 Change in stocks In percent of GDP, volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
4 Labour market   
4.1 Unemployment  In percent of total workforce, ILO definition, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
4.2 Employment  Number of employees, partially estimated, seasonally adjusted ECB/ 
Eurostat 
4.3 Shortage of labour Percent of firms in the manufacturing sector reporting a shortage of labour 
(unfilled job openings) as a constraint to production, seasonally adjusted  
ECFIN 
4.4 Wages  Not fully harmonised concept, but representative for each Member State 
(mostly hourly earnings) 
ECFIN 
5 International transactions  
5.1 Export order books Industry survey; balance of positive and negative replies, seasonally adjusted ECFIN 
5.2 World trade Bn; EUR, current prices, seasonally adjusted ECFIN 
5.3 Exports of goods Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro area trade, fob Eurostat 
5.4 Imports of goods  Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro area trade, cif Eurostat 
5.5 Trade balance Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro area trade, fob-cif Eurostat 
5.6 Exports of goods and 
services  
Volume (1995 prices), including intra euro area trade, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
5.7 Imports of goods and 
services  
Volume (1995 prices), including intra euro area trade, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
5.8 Current account balance  Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro area transactions; before 1997 partly estimated ECB 
5.9 Direct investment   (net) Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro area transactions ECB 
5.10 Portfolio investment  (net) Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro area transactions ECB 
6 Prices   
6.1 HICP  Harmonised index of consumer prices Eurostat 
6.2 Core HICP Harmonised index of consumer prices, excluding energy and unprocessed 
food 
Eurostat 
6.3 Producer prices Without construction Eurostat 
6.4 Import prices Import unit value index for goods  Eurostat 
7 Monetary and financial indicators  
7.1 Interest rate  Percent p.a., 3-month interbank money market rate, period averages Datastream
7.2 ECB repo rate Percent p.a., minimum bid rate of the ECB, end of period Datastream
7.3 Bond yield Percent p.a., 10-year government bond yields, lowest level prevailing in the 
euro area, period averages 
Datastream
7.4 Stock markets  DJ Euro STOXX50 index, period averages Datastream
7.5 M3  Seasonally adjusted moving average moving average (3 last months)  ECB 
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7.6 Credit to private sector 
(loans) 
MFI loans to euro area residents excluding MFIs and general government, 
monthly values: month end values, annual values: annual averages 
ECB 
7.7 Exchange rate USD/EUR  Period averages ECB 
7.8 Nominal effective exchange 
rate 
Against 13 other industrialised countries, double export weighted, 1995 = 
100, increase (decrease): appreciation (depreciation) 
ECFIN 
 
 
 
__________________________________ 
 
Contributors to this issue are: 
Recent economic developments and short-term prospects  Carsten Brzeski, Hans Feddersen 
and Eric Ruscher 
Assessing developments in profitability in the euro area  Eric Ruscher and James Watson  
The financial health of the private sector in the euro area  At Draaisma and Massimo 
Suardi 
Focus: The pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy in EMU  Sven Langedijk 
Overall co-ordination and editing  Joost Kuhlmann and Eric Ruscher 
Data assistance was provided by Danila Conte   
 
 
Comments on the report would be gratefully received and should be sent to the Editor-in-Chief: 
 
Servaas Deroose 
Director – Economy of the euro zone and the Union 
Economic and Financial Affairs Directorate-General 
European Commission 
Rue de la loi 200  BU1 0/209 
B-1049 Brussels 
 
or by e-mail to servaas.deroose@cec.eu.int, eric.ruscher@cec.eu.int or joost.kuhlmann@cec.eu.int 
 
